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In 2006, Mr. James Calvin Tillman became the first person in
Connecticut to be exonerated through the use of post-conviction DNA
testing. He joined a group of DNA exonerees that currently numbers
more than 200 nationwide. In many ways, Mr. Tillman's case is a
paradigmatic DNA exoneration-involving a cross-racial mistaken
eyewitness identification, issues of race, and faulty forensic testimony.
This Article uses the published opinions affirming Mr. Tillman's
conviction-particularly his direct appeal to the Connecticut Supreme
Court, and his appeal from the state habeas proceeding-to reflect on
the meaning of appellate and postconviction proceedings. Does Mr.
Tillman's exoneration reveal any problems with appellate litigation,
or is it the product of mistakes in investigation and adjudication that
are beyond the purview of appellate courts? There is no question that
the root causes of Mr. Tillman's wrongful conviction must be
addressed at the investigatory and trial level. In this article, I argue
that state appeals courts play an important role in signaling the types
of issues that should concern judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys. Certain features of appellate review that appear in the
Tillman opinions-heavy reliance on tools that I describe loosely as
"harm-type" and "preservation-type" analyses, as well as deferential
ineffective assistance of counsel standards---can contribute over the
long-term to local criminal justice cultures that fail to guard
adequately against wrongful convictions.

INTRODUCTION

In 1991, the Connecticut Supreme Court issued an opinion in the case
of State v. Tillman,l affirming the conviction of Mr. James C. Tillman
for the kidnapping and sexual assault of a Hartford office worker. 2 Mr.
Tillman, an African-American man charged with the rape of a white
woman, was convicted by a jury of five whites and one Hispanic? At
trial, Mr. Tillman took the stand to maintain his innocence, and offered a
childhood friend as an alibi witness. 4 On appeal, Mr. Tillman claimed
that the composition of the pool from which his jury was drawncontaining only two African-Americans (both women) and only one
I. State v. Tillman, 600 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1991).
2. Id. at 748.
3. Tillman v. Warden, No. 90844, 1997 WL 374961, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997), affd sub.
nom. Tillman v. Comm'r ofCorr., 738 A.2d 208.
4. Trial Transcript at 422, 434, Tillman, 600 A.2d 738 (No. 53889).
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resident of Hartford-was racially skewed. 5 He argued that this was
especially damaging to him, since his trial followed a murder that
received extensive publicity, a case in which another African-American
man, Daniel Webb, ultimately was convicted and sentenced to death for
the rape and murder of a white female Hartford office worker. 6 In fact,
Mr. Tillman was innocent.
Unaware that it was dealing with an actually innocent defendant, the
Connecticut Supreme Court rejected Mr. Tillman's claim. 7 It also
rejected a claim that Mr. Tillman's jury should have been instructed that
it could consider whether the victim was physically impaired or under
stress in judging the potential accuracy of her identification of Mr.
Tillman as her assailant. s Mr. Tillman's forty-five year sentence was
affirmed, over a dissent by Justice Berdon. 9 The U.S. Supreme Court
denied certiorari. lo Eight years after the decision on direct appeal, the
Connecticut Appellate Court-Connecticut's intermediate appeals
court-affirmed the rejection of Mr. Tillman's ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in state habeas proceedinfs. II The Connecticut Supreme
Court denied a petition for certification. I The state proceedings were at
an end.
The opinions in Mr. Tillman's case were published in the Connecticut
reports. The Connecticut Supreme Court said that the defendant had
failed to offer sufficient supporting evidence for his jury array claim.13
Given the victim's "positive identification testimony," it was not
reasonably probable that the jury had been misled by the lack of the
eyewitness identification instruction. 14 In the habeas proceeding, the
Appellate Court affirmed the conclusion that trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to request a hearing on the jury selection claim. 15
Trial counsel's investigation of that claim-consisting of a conversation
with the jury clerk and observation of the racial make-up of the jury
sitting in the next courtroom-was deemed professionally adequate. 16

5. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 740.
6. [d. at 752 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
7. [d. at 743-44 (majority opinion).
8. [d. at 7~5.
9. [d. at 740.
10. Tillman v. Connecticut, 505 U.S. 1207 (1992).
II. Tillman v. Comm'r of Corr., 738 A.2d 208 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
12. Tillman v. Comm'r ofCorr., 739 A.2d 1250 (Conn. 1999).
13. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 742-43.
14. [d. at 745.
15. Tillman, 738 A.2d at 212.
16. [d. at212-13.
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The petitioner had failed to establish prejudice. 17 Mr. Tillman's story
seemed to end like so many other criminal cases.
Eighteen years after Mr. Tillman's arrest, the script flipped. In 2006,
with the help of Connecticut Innocence Project attorneys Karen
Goodrow and Brian Carlow, Mr. Tillman was exonerated by
postconviction DNA testing. IS Governor M. Jodi Rell signed a bill
giving Mr. Tillman $5 million in compensation. 19 After Mr. Tillman was
freed, the DNA evidence from the case was linked to another man, then
incarcerated in Virginia. 2o James Calvin Tillman joined the ranks of an
estimated 238 others in the United States exonerated by postconviction
testing. 21
This Article seeks to use Mr. Tillman's exoneration as an occasion to
reflect on the appellate and postconviction processes in local criminal
courts. State appeals courts function as leaders in local criminal justice
systems. In their opinions, they not only resolve legal issues, but also
signal to judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys where they must
tread carefully, and which types of issues they can safely ignore without
worrying about a reversal or a finding of ineffectiveness. Mr. Tillman's
case is interesting precisely because it initially presents as a run-of-themill criminal appeal, without a clear-cut claim of actual innocence or a
slam-dunk legal issue. It challenges us to consider the aggregate impact
of state courts' treatment of apparently routine cases, both on the
development of doctrine and on the customary practice and psyche of
the bench and bar.
Although this story takes place in Connecticut, it has national
relevance and teaches lessons of general import. This is in part because
State v. Tillman is in some ways nearly a paradigmatic DNA exoneration
case. The case presents the recurring issues of mistaken eyewitness
identification,22 and particularly erroneous cross-racial identification. 23

17. Id. at2I2.
18. Matt Burgard & Elizabeth Hamilton, Dogged Pursuit Freed Inmate; Lawyers Kept Up Hunt
Until Finding Key DNA, HARTFORD COURANT, June 11,2006, at AI; Matt Burgard, His Challenge
Now: Freedom; Wrongly Convicted. Tillman is Formally Exonerated, HARTFORD COURANT, July 12,
2006, at AI.
19. Mark Pazniokas & Colin Poitras, Payment/or the Pain; Putting a Price on 18 Stolen Years,
Lawmakers Approve $5 Million Award for Wrongly Imprisoned Man, HARTFORD COURANT, May 17,
2007, at AI.
20. Colin Poitras & Tina Brown, A Cold Case Suspect, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 1,2008, at
AI.
21. As of May 29, 2009, the Innocence Project recorded 238 people exonerated by DNA. See
The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.orglknow (last visited May 29, 2009).
22. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 73 (2008) [hereinafter
Garrett, Judging Innocence] (identifying four types of faulty evidence which "typically" supported the
200 erroneous convictions: "eyewitness identifications, forensic evidence, informant testimony, or
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Through the jury venire claim,24 the case also highlights the role of race
25
in wrongful conviction.
An evidentiary issue that was litigated in Mr.
Tillman's case raised the specter of faulty police investigation,26 another
27
The appellate

common contributing factor to wrongful convictions.
opinions are also noteworthy for the issues that are

not raised

about the

suggestive eyewitness identification procedure and inaccurate serology
testimony.28
While this Article is informed by social science research, it is not a
"post-mortem" of State v. Tillman, as have been skillfully done in other
29
cases. Nor do I outline recommended criminal justice reforms: critical
reforms have been urged, and in some areas are taking place, at the level
1
32
of investigation,30 trial adjudication/ and forensic analysis.
Indeed,

confessions").
23. Id. at 79 (noting that "48% of exonerees convicted based on eyewitness testimony were
identified cross-racially").
24. State v. Tillman, 600 A.2d 738, 740-44 (Conn. 1991).
25. Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 22, at 66 (noting that "[m]any more exonerees were
minorities (71 %) than is typical even among average populations of rape and murder convicts").
26. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 747.
27. See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal
Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1585 (2005) (discussing generally how wrongful convictions have
highlighted the problem offaulty investigation).
28. As discussed further in Part III, Professor Brandon Garrett has pointed out that review of a
transcript of the forensic analyst's testimony at Mr. Tillman's trial, as part of an article by Garrett and
Peter J. Neufeld, Improper Forensic Science and Wrongfol Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. I (2009),
uncovered that the analyst testified inaccurately about the serology evidence. Among other things, he
failed to acknowledge that testing results might have been inconclusive due to degradation of a key
sample. Email from Professor Brandon Garrett to author (May 22, 2008) (on file with author)
(discussing Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 317-27). As in so many other exoneration cases that
involved faulty forensic science, see Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 22, at 85, this evidence was
not challenged on appeal or in postconviction proceedings in Mr. Tillman's case.
29. See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongfol Conviction: Theoretical Implications
and Practical Solutions, 51 VILL L. REV. 337 (2006); Susan Rutberg, Anatomy of a Miscarriage of
Justice: The Wrongfol Conviction ofPeter J. Rose, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 7 (2006).
30. See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE (1996). See
also Richard A. Leo & Richard 1. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of
Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998); Daniel S. Medwed, Innocence Lost ... and Found: An Introduction to the
Faces of Wrongful Conviction Symposium Issue, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. I (2006); Barry C.
Scheck, Barry Scheck Lectures on Wrongful Convictions, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 597 (2006). See also Paul
C. Giannelli & Myrna S. Raeder, Achieving Justice: Freeing the Innocent, Convicting the Guilty, 37 Sw.
L. REv. 763 (2008).
31. See, e.g., Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering
Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1487, 1494-95 (2008)
(arguing for a rule requiring corroboration of eyewitness testimony for a conviction). See also Rory K.
Little, Addressing the Evidentiary Sources of Wrongfol Convictions: Categorical Exclusion of Evidence
in Capital Statutes, 37 SW. L. REV. 965 (2008).
32. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE U.S.: A PATH
FORWARD (2009) (urging increased standardization and professionalization of forensic science
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one of the areas most often targeted for change is present in Mr.
Tillman's case-eyewitness identification procedures. 33
My project is to focus on the appellate opinions in State v. Tillman. In
some ways, the Tillman opinions function as an interesting specimen of
routine local criminal appellate process: marked more by analysis of
preservation issues and weighing of facts than by enunciation of new
legal principles. On direct appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court
rejected four out of five appellate issues in Mr. Tillman's appeal based
on what I will describe loosely as defense counsel's omissions: to
request an evidentiary hearing;34 to object;35 to raise a claim in the trial
court;36 or to "attempt to lay a proper foundation.,,37
The court said that the defendant had failed to present an adequate
record on his claim of racial bias in selection of the jury venire despite
the fact that counsel represented that the jury clerk believed that she had
excused disproportionate numbers of minority jurors. 38 Later, in habeas
proceedings, Connecticut courts also rejected the claim that trial counsel
had been ineffective for failing to make a record on the jury selection
issue-the same record that the Connecticut Supreme Court had said
was lacking on direct appeal. 39
In its treatment of the only issue not rejected based on counsel's
purported inaction-a challenge to an instruction on factors the jury
could consider in evaluating the victim's identification ofMr. Tillman as
her assailant-the Connecticut Supreme Court relied on the strength of

disciplines}; Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the
Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL 1. REv. 893, 951-58 (2008) (calling for increased regulation of crime
laboratories and establishment of a "forensic science oversight commission"); Garrett & Neufeld, supra
note 28, at manuscript 63-66 (on file with authors) (calling for the creation of a national body to
promulgate standards for forensic science).
33. Professor Gary 1. Wells has been a leading researcher and reform proponent in the area of
eyewitness identification for years. Articles of his that are too numerous to cite document issues relating
to eyewitness identification and the impact of proposed reforms. See, e.g., Gary 1. Wells, Eyewitness
Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 WIS. 1. REv. 615 (2006); Gary 1. Wells, Amina Memon, &
Steven D. Penrod, Eyewitness Identification: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN THE
PUB. INT. 45 (2006); See also Timothy P. O'Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Braithwaite Revisited:
Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures,
41 VAL. U. 1. REv. 109 (2006); Sandra Guerra Thompson, What Price Justice? The Importance of
Costs to Eyewitness Identification Reform, 41 TEX. TECH. 1. REv. 33 (2008). See also Margery Malkin
Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices to Protect the Innocent, CREIGHTON 1.
REv. (forthcoming 2009).
34. State v. Tillman, 600 A.2d 738, 740-44 (Conn. 1991).
35. Id. at 746.
36. Id. at 747.
37. Id. at 748.
38. Id. at 740-41,743.
39. Tillman v. Comrn'r of Corr., 738 A.2d 208, 2 \3 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
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the victim's "positive" identification of Mr. Tillman. 40 This analysis was
based largely on the victim's subjective certainty and assessment of her
opportunity to view-factors that have been questioned by later social
science. 41
Reflecting on the Tillman opinions, I make two sets of claims in this
Article. Observations in the first group are relatively concrete and
directly tied to Mr. Tillman's case. Simply put, in light of DNA
exonerations like Mr. Tillman's case, as well as recent social science
research, state courts should be careful with single eyewitness cases,
particularly those involving cross-racial identifications. 42 This means
demanding the most exacting investigation and vigorous representation;
requiring the most scrupulous attention to any claim of racial bias; and
mandating all appropriate jury instructions. 43
My second set of claims is more general, and it is this set of ideas that
is the real focus of the Article. I argue that the work of state appellate
courts sets the tone for a criminal justice system, and provides (although
imperfectly) important incentives for the allocation of resources at the
investigative and trial levels. Certain aspects of the Tillman opinionnotably reliance on preservation-type rules and harm-type analysis-can
dilute appellate scrutiny. While these appellate conventions are not the
primary cause of Mr. Tillman's wrongful conviction, over the long-term
and in the aggregate, they can increase the likelihood of miscarriages of
justice.
Mr. Tillman's story has become part of an ongoing national
conversation about the meaning of the DNA exonerations. 44
Commentators ask what the DNA exonerations can teach us about our
criminal justice system. 45 They debate how often wrongful convictions
occur,46 and, if we can establish an error rate, whether it is an acceptable
40. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 745.
41. Id. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 178-224 and accompanying text.
43. See David E. Aaronson, Cross-Racial Identification of Defendants in Criminal Cases: A
Proposed Model Jury Instruction, 23 CRIM. JUST. 4 (Spring 2008) (proposing a special jury instruction
for cross-racial eyewitness identification cases).
44. Adam Liptak, Study of Wrongful Convictions Raises Questions Beyond DNA, N.Y. DMES,
July 23, 2007, at AI; Adam Liptak, Study Suspects Thousands of False Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, April
19,2004, at A15.
45. BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES
WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT (2003); WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED
JUSTICE (Sandra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey, Eds., 2001).
46. See D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 779-80 (2007) (positing an "empirical minimum
of 3.3% and a fairly generous likely maximum of 5% for factually wrongful convictions in capital rapemurders in the 1980s"). See also Adam Liptak, Consensus on Counting the Innocent: We Can't, N.Y.
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one. 47 Observers consider what parts of the system could be fixed to
reduce the potential for error. 48 They warn that, with the increasing use
of pretrial DNA testing, the window for using DNA exonerations to
learn about systemic flaws is rapidly closing. 49
Other commentators have examined the legal claims raised by the
exonerated, and how those claims were treated by the courts. Most
notably, Professor Brandon Garrett conducted a study of all of the
claims raised by 200 exonerees-tracking legal contentions on direct
appeal, state postconviction, and in federal habeas. 50 Mr. Tillman's case
is one of the 200 analyzed by Professor Garrett. 5 I Professor Garrett
determined that, of the exonerees whose wrongful convictions were
based on bogus forensic science, untruthful informant testimony, or a
mistaken eyewitness identification, less than half brought legal claims
challenging those types of evidence on appeal or in postconviction
proceedings. 52 Of those who did raise such claims, only a handful gained
relief. 53 The reversal rate for the exonerees was roughly comparable to
the reversal rate for a matched comparison set of defendants convicted
of similar crimes who were never exonerated. 54 Thus, Professor Garrett
concluded that appellate and postconviction courts were unable to
"effectively review claims relating to the unreliable or false evidence"
supporting the exonerees' wrongful convictions. 55
State courts are a critical bulwark against miscarriages of justice.
Always on the frontline of criminal justice, state courts increasingly
operate without even the emergency safety hatch previously provided by

TIMES, March 25, 2008, at A14.
47. Risinger, supra note 46, at 763-64 (discussing historical debate regarding the acceptable
error rate for a criminal justice system). See also Morris B. Hoffman, The 'Innocence' Myth, WALL ST.
I., April 26, 2007, at A19.
48. Solomon Moore, Exoneration Using DNA Brings Change in Legal System, N.Y. TIMES,
October I, 2007, at A I.
49. Writing in the New York Times, Adam Liptak concluded his coverage of Prof. Brandon
Garrett's study of the DNA exoneration cases by saying, "The era of DNA exonerations should be a
finite one. These days, DNA testing is common on the front end of prosecutions, meaning that in a few
years, the window that the 200 exonerations have opened on the justice system will close. We should
look carefully through that window while we can." Liptak, Study of Wrongful Convictions Raises
Questions Beyond DNA, supra note 44. See also Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence. Harmless Error, and
Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REv. 35, 110 (2005) [hereinafter Garrett, Harmless
Error] ("[I]fpretrial DNA testing becomes routine, the window of opportunity that exonerations provide
may begin to close.").
50. Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 22.
51. Id. at app. A.
52. /d. at 76.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 102.
55. Id. at 94.
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Federal habeas has been restricted by successive judge-

made rules over the course of thirty years. 57 A little over a decade ago, it
was constrained decisively by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of

1996

(AEDPA).5s Federal courts' ability to grant state

prisoners habeas relief is now hobbled. As a result, state courts possess
nearly

exclusive

responsibility

to

protect

state

prisoners'

federal

constitutional rights-and to guard against miscarriages of justice. 59
State trials and state habeas proceedings are overseen by state appellate
courts,

and,

circumscribe

in
the

numerous
rights

ways,

protected

state
and

appeals
relief

court

available

decisions
10

those

proceedings.
At the same time, state courts are increasingly overwhelmed by
caseload pressures. The United States currently incarcerates

2.3

million

people-the highest incarceration rate (and indeed largest prisoner
60
population) in the world.
Predictably, rising incarceration rates can
61
strain the resources of local courtS.

56. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 YALE LJ. 1035, 1036, 1041 (1977) (positing that the Warren Court had designated
federal habeas as the enforcement mechanism for its constitutional criminal procedure revolution,
employing a strategy of "redundancy," in which state and federal courts could check one another). My
thoughts on the increased pressure on state courts after AEDPA also have been influenced by a panel on
state-federal court relations held on March 7, 2008, as part of the Liman Colloquium at Yale Law
School, featuring Justice Randall Shepard of the Indiana Supreme Court, Justice Margaret H. Marshall
of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, former Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court
Ellen Ash Peters, and Judge Janet C. Hall of the United States District Court of the District of
Connecticut. See also Lynn Adelman, The Great Writ Diminished, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv.
CONFINEMENT 3,11-15 (2009).
57. See RANDy HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 22.1 (5th ed. 2005) (summarizing judge-made and statutory restrictions to federal
habeas); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE LJ. I, 513 (1997) (outlining doctrinal restrictions on habeas).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(2006). See also Adelman, supra note 56, at 15-20.
59. See Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity or "Redressability" after
Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Court Rules of
Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REv. I (2009); Giovanna Shay &
Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased Importance Under AEDPA
of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments of State Courts, 50 WM. & MARy L. REv. 211 (200S). See also
Ana M. Otero, In Harm's Way-A Dismal State of Justice: The Legal Odyssey of Cesar Fierro, 16 LA
RAZA LJ. 119, 121 (2005) (arguing that misapplication of harmless error doctrine is even more inimical
to constitutional rights after restrictions offederal habeas).
60. Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at
A I. See also PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA IN 2008, available at htl
p:/Iwww.pewcenteronthestates.orgluploadedFiles/SOI5PCTS_ Prison08_FINAL _ 2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf.
61. DANIEL J. MEADOR ET AL., ApPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES,
AND PERSONNEL 23 (2006) (describing an "extraordinary rise in the number of appellate filings
beginning in the late 1960s and continuing through the last third of the twentieth century" that places
appellate courts, particularly those responsible for fIrst appeal as of right "under the constant threat of
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Let me be clear that my purpose is not to criticize the Connecticut
Appellate Court and Connecticut Supreme Court for failing to identify
Mr. Tillman as a factually innocent person. We know more now than we
did when Mr. Tillman was charged and tried. Moreover, the causes of
wrongful conviction are complex, and as the Article discusses in Part III,
appellate courts' institutional role and capacity are limited. I have
considerable respect for Connecticut institutions, and it is fair to say that
Connecticut's criminal justice system at least strives to protect
defendants' rights in important ways that many jurisdictions do not. 62
Connecticut courts have not been insensitive to the possibility of
wrongful convictions. 63 Nor have they shrunk: from exerclsmg
supervisory authority over the criminal courts,64 sometimes in cases
involving allegations of racial bias. 65 It is entirely possible that no
amount of rigorous appellate review could have counter-balanced an
erroneous eyewitness identification by a sympathetic victim.
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to examine Mr. Tillman's case closely.
Appellate opinions are an artifact of the case, and, in Professor Dianne
Martin's terms, shed light on how the prosecution was "constructed.,,66
engulfment and the build-up of unacceptable backlogs"); Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass
Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARv. C. R.-C.L. L.
REv. 339, 340 (2006) (arguing that "mass incarceration has created serious obstacles to the reliable
administration of criminal justice and overwhelmed post-conviction review mechanisms.")
62. For example, Connecticut provides a generous statutory right to appointed counsel. See, e.g.,
State v. Casiano, 922 A.2d 1065 (Conn. 2007); Gipson v. Comm'r OfCOTT., 778 A.2d 121 (Conn. 2001).
See State v. Golding, 567 A.2d 823 (Conn. 1989) (discussing review of un preserved constitutional error
on direct appeal). See also State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) (discussing the heightened
protection of individual rights under the state constitution); State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446 (Conn.
1988) (discussing the same).
63. See, e.g., Miller v. Comm'r of Corr., 700 A.2d 1108, 1136-37 (Conn. 1997) (establishing
standard for postconviction claim of actual innocence and affirming habeas court determination of
petitioner's actual innocence); Summerville v. Warden, 641 A.2d 1356,1368 (Conn. 1994) (recognizing
that claim of actual innocence is cognizable in habeas corpus without "antecedent showing of a
constitutional violation that affected the fairness of his criminal trial"); State v. Hammond, 604 A.2d
793, 804-05, 807-08 (Conn. 1992) (remanding to trial court for reconsideration of motion to set aside
the verdict and motion for additional post-trial DNA testing in light of exculpatory DNA evidence).
64. See, e.g., State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290 (Conn. 2005) (declining to adopt a new test for
judging the admissibility of eyewitness identifications that are the product of suggestive procedures, but
requiring a jury instruction under the court's supervisory authority when line-up administrators fail to
warn the witness that the culprit may not be in the line-up); State v. Holloway, 553 A.2d 166, 171-72
(Conn. 1989) (exercising its supervisory authority to require the State to provide a prima facie case
response to Batson challenges "in all future cases in which the defendant asserts a Batson claim").
65. See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1,21-22 (Conn. 1998) (reversing and remanding for
broader hearing regarding alleged racial slurs by juror); State v. Brown, 668 A.2d 1288, 1302 (Conn.
1995) (concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion in failing to sua sponte order a hearing to
investigate "credible allegations of jury exposure to racially derogatory remarks").
66. See Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About Justice from the "Laboratory" of Wrongful
Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L. REv. 847,
849 (2002) (describing criminal convictions as a "social product" which are "constructed from the
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If we fail to reflect on possible lessons of his story, we will miss a rare
opportunity to gain insight into the criminal appeals and postconviction
litigation process.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I lays out the two opinions in
Mr. Tillman's case, so that their reasoning can serve as a case study. Part
II focuses on the factors that Mr. Tillman's case shares with other
wrongful convictions. Part III uses Mr. Tillman's story as a vantage
point from which to examine the role of appellate courts and types of
appellate reasoning that fail to serve as an adequate hedge against
wrongful convictions. Part IV questions whether appellate courts really
can help to avoid future wrongful convictions. Part V concludes by
offering a few reflections about how we can achieve more meaningful
appellate litigation.
I. THE OPINIONS IN MR. TILLMAN'S CASE

We begin with the opinions in Mr. Tillman's case. Despite Mr.
Tillman's exoneration, these decisions are still binding precedent in
Connecticut, publicly available under the captions State of Connecticut
v. James C. Tillman 67 and Tillman v. Commissioner of Correction. 68 The
Connecticut Supreme Court opinion in Mr. Tillman's case gained some
attention in 2008 in the case of another Innocence Project client, Miguel
Roman, who was exonerated based on DNA evidence. 69 State v. Tillman
was cited in the 1992 opinion affirming Mr. Roman's conviction. 7o
A threshold question worth noting in passing is whether the opinions
in the case should be available in their current form. In some ways, this
question gets to the heart of the role of appellate courts. Does the
opinion lose its legitimacy if the outcome is wrong, or does it remain a
"correct" statement of abstract legal principles? Does the answer to this
question depend on the extent to which the analysis is fact-bound? At a
minimum, it seems unfair to link Mr. Tillman's name to an awful crime
that he did not commit. 71 One might also question whether advocates
results of a myriad of exercises in discretion as to relevance, reliability, and weight").
67. 600 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1991).
68. 738 A.2d 208 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
69. Dave Altimari & David Owens, DNA: Righting Another Wrong?, HARTFORD COURANT,
Dec. 17,2008, at AI; Susan Haigh, Conn. Man Imprisonedfor 20 Years Gets New Trial, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 19, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.comJUS/wireStory?id=6495925; David Owens,
"True Freedom" After a Two-Decade Ordeal, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 3, 2009, at A5.
70. State v. Roman, 224 Conn. 63,68 (1992) (rejecting claim that Mr. Roman did not have "a
sufficient command of the English language to participate knowingly and willingly in his interrogation
by police," and citing Tillman for the proposition that statements of counsel are not evidence).
71. In a recent opinion, a Connecticut trial court reviewing a decision of the Freedom of
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and courts should continue to rely on an opinion based on fundamental
factual errors, at least with respect to certain issues.72 While one can
conceive of an argument that traditional vacatur doctrine might apply,13
legislatures also might consider expanding vacatur to apply to published
opinions affirming exonerees' convictions. Alternatively, exonerations
might be noted in the published reports, or in the case history.74
A. The Direct Appeal

Mr. Tillman was convicted at trial of kidnapping in the first degree,
sexual assault in the first degree, robbery in the third degree, assault in
the third degree, and larceny in the second degree. 75 Like many such
serious cases, the facts of the crime were brutal. In her opinion for the
court, Justice Peters summarized the facts that the jury "could
reasonably have found":
On the evening of January 21, 1988, at about 11 p.m., the victim fmished
her work at an insurance company in Hartford and moved her car from
her company's garage to an outside parking lot on Columbus Boulevard
so that it would be easier to retrieve later. After having gone to a bar with
her supervisor and coworkers, she returned to the car with her supervisor
Infonnation Commission regarding a request by the Associated Press for Mr. Tillman's correctional
records acknowledged that "the disclosure of such records would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person in Tillman's unique position-that is, to an innocent person who has served a lengthy sentence
for a serious crime that he indisputably did not commit." Tillman v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, No.
CV074044748S, 2008 WL 4150289, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 15,2008).
72. A Westlaw keycite search of May 15,2009, revealed sixty-seven Connecticut cases citing to
the Connecticut Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Tillman, including cases involving claims of racial
bias in selection of the jury venire and inadequate jury instructions on eyewitness identification. See
State v. Saucier, 926 A.2d 633, 650 n.1 (Conn. 2007) (Norcott, J., concurring in part, with whom Zarella
and Sullivan, Js., joined) (noting the Appellate Court's "misplaced reliance" on Tillman in State v.
Gonzalez, 815 A.2d 1261 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003), rev'd, 864 A.2d 847 (Conn. 2005), regarding the
proper standard of review for evidentiary issues); State v. Carrasco, 791 A.2d 511, 517 (Conn. 2002)
(composition of jury venire); State v. Robinson, 631 A.2d 288, 293 (Conn. 1993) (composition of jury
venire); State v. Cerilli, 610 A.2d 1130, 1136 (Conn. 1992) (citing Tillman for the proposition that an
instruction on eyewitness identification is not constitutionally required, and concluding that although an
instruction was "warranted" in this case, failure to give it did not require reversal); State v. Young, 618
A.2d65, 73-74 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (jury selection). There were eleven citations to Tillman in
secondary sources available on Westlaw. For example, Tillman is cited in the 2007 edition of 5 DAVID
M. BORDEN & LEONARD ORLAND, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES: CONNECTICUT CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 3.15, at 214 (4th ed. 2007). The Connecticut Appellate Court's opinion in the habeas
appeal had been cited by Connecticut courts twenty times, and by secondary sources two times.
73. See State v. Boyle, 949 A.2d 460, 467 (Conn. 2008) (describing vacatur as an "equitable ...
extraordinary" remedy); State v. Singleton, 876 A.2d I, 9 (Conn. 2005) (recognizing "general
proposition that vacatur is appropriate when it is in the public interest to prevent a judgment, otherwise
unreviewable because ofmootness, from spawning legal consequences");
74. Thanks to Professors Jack Chin and Keith Findley for suggesting this compromise solution.
75. Tillman v. State, 600 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1991).
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at about 12:45 a.m. Her supervisor left after observing her start her car
and put her car lights on.
In the process of backing the car up, the victim noticed that she did not
have her seat belt on and that the driver's side door was not locked. As
she stopped to remedy this situation, the defendant opened the driver's
side door and attempted to enter her car. When she asked what he was
doing, the defendant punched her in the face, then reached in and turned
off the ignition. He then hit her again and pushed her over to the
passenger side of the car. When she screamed and tried to get out through
the passenger door, he reached over, locked the door and hit her several
more times.
The defendant, thereafter, started the car, but could not keep it from
stalling because he was unfamiliar with a standard transmission. Finally,
after fifteen to twenty minutes, he drove out of the parking lot and, a few
minutes later, parked in another small outside lot. He took the victim's
purse and jewelry, and then sexually assaulted her. After rifling through
her briefcase, he drove the car out of the lot. He then stopped the car and
76
ran off with her purse.
The police report, which was reprinted by the clerk's office as part of the
court's "Record" states that the victim was "bleeding profusely from her
face and appeared to have been beaten severely.,,77
On direct appeal, Mr. Tillman raised a number of claims challenging
his conviction. He alleged racial discrimination in the selection of the
jury pool. He faulted trial court instructions on eyewitness identification,
consciousness of guilt, and the use of prior inconsistent statements.
Finally, he appealed the trial court's exclusion of a police social
worker's field notes regarding statements made by a detective about the
investigation. 78 Pursuant to a Connecticut procedural rule that permits
the Connecticut Supreme Court to transfer cases of first impression
directly to itself,79 the appeals were transferred from the Connecticut
Appellate Court to the Connecticut Supreme Court, skipping the
intermediate appeal. 80

1. The Jury Selection Claim
Mr. Tillman's claim of racial discrimination in the selection of the
76. [d. at 740.
77. Record at 3, Tillman, 600 A.2d 738
78. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 740.

(No. 14805).

79. JUDICIAL BRANCH, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK § 65-1 (2008).
Wesley W. Horton & Kenneth J. Bartschi, 2007 Connecticut Appellate Review, 82 CONN. BJ. 14
(2008) ("The transfer rule set forth in Practice Book section 65-1 allows the Supreme Court to cherrypick many of the issues of first impression that first appear on the Appellate Court's docket.").
80. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 740.
See
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jury array received the most extensive analysis by the Connecticut
Supreme Court. The facts underlying this claim arose during jury
selection. After six jurors were chosen, a second jury panel was called to
select the alternates. 8! At that point, Mr. Tillman, an African-American
man, pointed out that the jury panels contained no black men and only
one resident of Hartford, the city where Mr. Tillman lived and where the
crime had occurred. 82 He noted the increased publicity surrounding the
Daniel Webb case, and asked for a more representative jury pane1. 83
Defense counsel read a statement by Mr. Tillman:
Your Honor, I object to the jury array. I do not feel that this is a jury of
my own peer[s] and therefore it will be impossible for me to have a fair
trial. Especially considering the facts of the Danny Webb case which has
been in all the news and newspapers. And the fact that his case alleges
that he [attacked] a middle class white woman from one of the suburban
towns, which in fact is what my jury panel was made of. There were only
two blacks from the entire panels in which I had to choose from. I'm sure
that this [doesn't] comply with the statistical percentage of blacks for this
geographical area. Therefore, this cannot be a jury of my peer[s] and [it]
will be impossible for me to have a fair trial. I therefore state for the
record at this time, I would like to challenge the jury array and ask the
court to order whatever [is] necessary for me to do this. 84

The trial court ruled that the motion would not be granted unless the
defendant could present evidence of discriminatory selection methods.
Defense counsel represented that he would inquire with the jury clerk. 85
A number of days later, defense counsel reported back to the trial
court what he had learned. The jury clerk had said that she excused
jurors for economic hardship if they could demonstrate that their
employers would not pay the difference between their daily juror pay of
$10 and their normal wages. 86 The jury clerk acknowledged that this
custom could result in the excusal of a "disproportionate number of
minorities. ,,87 Despite this representation, the trial court rejected the
defendant's challenge to the jury array.88
After the verdict, Mr. Tillman moved for a new trial on the same
81. Id.
82. Id. In fact, the habeas court opinion from the trial level states that the jury was composed of
five whites and one Hispanic. Tillman v. Warden, No. 90844,1997 WL 374961 at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1997), affd sub nom. Tillman v. Comm'r ofCorr., 738 A.2d 208 (Conn. App. Ct. !999).
83. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 751-52 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 740 (majority opinion).
86. Id.
87. Jd. at 741.
88. Id.
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grounds; the trial court also denied that motion. 89 In this motion, which
was reproduced in the Record on appeal, defense counsel wrote:
This trial was conducted in the shadow of the events surrounding the
arrest and arraignment of a black man, one Daniel Webb (State v. Webb,
HartfordlNew Britain Judicial District Docket No. 55802) for capital
murder, kidnapping and possible sexual assault in the city of Hartford of a
white, female, downtown Hartford office worker. The alleged victim in
this case is also a white, female downtown Hartford office worker, and
the defendant is a black male. Virtually every venireperson voir dired for
this trial allowed that he or she was aware of the Webb case, and that he
or she would not be able to afford the presumption of innocence to Mr.
Webb of the twenty-four venirepersons impaneled, only two-both
female-were black. Only one, a black woman peremptorily excused by
the state, was a Hartford resident. There were no black males in the
panels. The six jurors and two alternates ultimately chosen in this case
were all white residents of towns suburban to Hartford. This court cannot
ignore the similarity of the charges, locale of the incidents and race and
gender similarities of the victims and defendants in the Webb case and in
the instant case. 90
In analyzing Mr. Tillman's claim, the Connecticut Supreme Court
applied both U.S. Supreme Court precedent, Duren v. Missouri,91 and a
Connecticut case, State v. Nims,92 which provide alternative means of
demonstrating racially discriminatory composition of the jury array.
Duren required a defendant to demonstrate "systematic exclusion" of a
"distinctive group in the community .... ,,93 Nims, on the other hand, did
not require a showing of underrepresentation of any distinctive group-only that "unconstitutional criteria" were used in selecting the members
of the jury array.94
The court rejected Mr. Tillman's challenge to his jury array. It
concluded that the defendant had failed to offer sufficient evidence in
support of his challenge. 95 It reasoned:
The defendant bears the burden of making an adequate record to support a
challenge to a jury array. All that this defendant ever offered to the court
in support of his request for a new supplemental panel was his counsel's
hearsay representations of a conversation he had had with the clerk. The
89. Id.
90. Record, supra note 77, at 27-28 (quoting paragraph 6 of Tillman's Motion for New Trial
filed Oct. 20, 1989).
91. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
92. 430 A.2d 1306 (Conn. 1980).
93. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 741 (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 742.
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defendant did not offer the clerk's own testimony or any other testimony.
He did not request an evidentiary hearing to support his claims, or a
continuance in order to gather probative evidence. A challenge to a jury
array will fail if the defendant presents no evidence to the court. A
representation by counsel does not meet this evidentiary requirement. 96
Under the Duren test, the court concluded, the defendant had failed to
demonstrate systematic exclusion. "While the procedure that counsel
described to the court did involve a systematic exclusion and might well
have exceeded the clerk's statutory authority," the court wrote, "no
proof was offered that that procedure was in fact followed.,,97 Similarly,
under Nims, the court reasoned, the defendant had failed to offer
evidence that a suspect classification was used as a method of jury
selection. "[T]he defendant in this case offered no supporting evidence
of any kind to establish his claim of unconstitutional discrimination," the
court concluded in rejecting Mr. Tillman's claim. 98
As we shall see, at the habeas hearing, the court clerk testified and
confirmed that the method she had described to defense counsel was in
fact the method that the clerk's office used to excuse jurors. She
believed that "many more minorities than others were excused from
service" on this basis. 99 However, this claim failed in habeas too, in part
because no evidence was offered to support the clerk's hypothesis about
the racial impact of the practice. 100
2. The Eyewitness Identification Instruction
Mr. Tillman also raised several claims regarding the jury instructions
at his trial. The first, and most significant, was a claim challenging the
trial court's denial of a requested instruction on eyewitness
identification. At trial, defense counsel had asked the trial judge to
instruct the jury that, in assessing the credibility of eyewitness
testimony, it could "consider ... whether the witness was physically
impaired or under stress when observing the perpetrator.,,101
The trial court declined to give the requested instruction, but instead
gave an instruction on eyewitness identification that overlapped
somewhat with the Manson v. Brathwaite l02 factors that are used to
96. Id. at 742-43 (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 743-44.
98. Id. at 744.
99. Tillman v. Warden, No. 90844, 1997 WL 374961, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 25, 1997),
affd sub nom. Tillman v. Comm'r o[Corr., 738 A.2d 208 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
100. Id. at *6-*8.
101. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 744.
102. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
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judge the reliability of an identification that is the subject of a due
process challenge. The trial court's instruction was as follows:
You have had evidence from a witness making an identification ... of the
defendant in this case. The factors to consider in making your judgment
of the reliability of such witness in making that identification are: first,
her opportunity to observe the person, how close, the amount of time, the
lighting conditions, the degree of attention, and the degree of stress;
second, her verbal description of the defendant as to consistencies or
inconsistencies to the defendant; third the time which passed between the
incident and the identification made of the photographs in this case and
the in court identification made by her of the defendant; fourth, any
incidents of suggestion as to which photo to select; and fifth, the certainty
with which the witness identified the person in the photographs marked as
state's exhibits C and D, and identif[ied] the person here in court. 103
The Connecticut Supreme Court acknowledged that the jury "might
reasonably have found" the victim's "capacity for accurate observation
... to have been somewhat impaired at the time of the incident.,,104 The
court summarized the victim's injuries that could have affected her
capacity to observe:
[B]efore the attack, the victim had been drinking. As a result of the attack,
she received a cut on her left eyebrow that bled and later required seven
stitches. Her left eye began to swell during the attack, and later closed
completely. The entire left side of her face was swollen after the attack.
Her right eye eventually became black and blue. Because she was hit in
the nose, she suffered a nosebleed. 105

In light of this "evidentiary foundation," the court said that "[t]he trial
court might appropriately have given the requested instruction.,,106
Nonetheless, it concluded that the instructions given by the trial judge
had "adequately alerted the jury to the factors that it had to assess in
determining the reliability of the victim's testimony.,,107
Even if the trial court's instructions "were less informative on the
risks of misidentification than they might have been," the court
continued, a new trial would not be warranted unless "the defendant
could establish that it was reasonably probable that the jury was

103. Brief of the Defendant-Appellant at app. F-4, State v. Tillman, 600 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1991)
(No. 14085) (quoting excelpt of transcript regarding instructions to the jury during Tillman's trial).
104. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 744. Indeed, there is some evidence that witnesses with higher blood
alcohol levels are more likely to make mistaken identifications from "target-absent" line-ups. Wells,
Memon, & Penrod, supra note 33, at 54.
105. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 744--45 (alteration in original).
\06. [d. at 745.
\07. [d.
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misled." I08
The court then marshaled the evidence of the victim's opportunity to
observe her assailant at the time of the assault:
The victim testified that she could see out of both eyes, and she never said
that she had any difficulty viewing her attacker. During much of the fifty
minutes that she was with him, they were in well-lighted areas. There
were street lights on Columbus Boulevard, where the car was parked
when the attacker entered it, and there were floodlights on an adjacent
building. When the attacker forced the victim back into her car, his face
was directly in front of hers and she was able to get a good look at his
face. During the entire fifteen to twenty minutes that the attacker was
having difficulty starting the car, the victim observed the right side of his
face. She tried to look at him as much as possible as the car passed under
the street lights of Columbus Boulevard. Because her left eye had been
hurt, she held her right arm against her right eye to protect it. Because the
area where the car stopped was well lit, the victim was able to view her
attacker. She testified that she "was trying to focus on his eyes, nose, the
shape of his face, things that I could remember, things that I would be
able to use to identify him by." His nose was particularly distinctive,
"[k]ind of like a hook nose." The street he drove the car onto after the
sexual assault was also well lit. 109
The court went on to summarize the evidence that the victim was able
to make an accurate identification of the suspect from a photo array
assembled by police:
After the attacker fled, the victim could not see very well out of her left
eye, but her right eye was unaffected. When the police arrived she told
them that she was certain she could identify her attacker, and she readily
picked the defendant's photograph from a properly assembled array.
When she was shown the first mug shot of the defendant, she correctly
noted that he seemed younger in the photograph. She testified that there
was no doubt in her mind that the defendant was the man who had
attacked her. 1\0
In light of this "positive identification testimony," the court concluded,
"it is not reasonably probable that the jury was misled by the court's
refusal to charge in the specific language that the defendant had
requested." III
108. Id. (citing State v. Shifflett, 508 A.2d 748, 766 (Conn. 1986)).
109. /d.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. This language from the court's opinion tracked very closely language from the State's
brief on appeal. The State had argued in its brief:
[T]he victim's identification testimony was strong and certain at all times. She was with
[the assailant] for approximately fifty minutes and made a conscious effort to view her
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The court did not mention that the victim had given at least two
descriptions of her attacker to police. She told the officer at the scene
that the assailant was "a black male in his twenties, approximately a
hundred and fifty pounds. Height was unknown. Medium complexion.
Fairly short afro, with long sideburns. Light colored clothes and a white
Kangol hat. ,,112 Three days later, at the police station, the victim told
investigators that her assailant was "a black male, estimated height of
five foot six inches to five foot ten inches, medium build, glassy eyes,
wearing a baseball cap and a rust-colored jacket.,,113 The Defendant's
brief pointed out that Mr. Tillman was five foot five inches tall, and that
the victim had not recalled the content of either of these descriptions at
the time of trial. 114
3. The Consciousness of Guilt Instruction
Mr. Tillman also challenged the trial court's instruction to the jury on
consciousness of guilt. The trial court had instructed the jury:
There is a legal principle of law known as consciousness of guilt, and it
applies when a defendant says or does an act which one can infer that he
had attempted to avoid detection or to avoid facts which would lead to his
conviction. Here again, this principle would apply to the defendant's
statements to Detective Kumnick when questioned how he ftot the
lacerations which were healing on the major knuckles of his hand. 5

The evidence at trial was that, when Detective Kumnick asked Mr.
Tillman how he had received the lacerations on his hands, he first said
that he was not sure and then said he had got them working at a car
wash. 116 According to the detective, Mr. Tillman then said, "I didn't get
those from punching no girl.,,117 The State's theory was that the

assailant and remember his features. She correctly noted that he seemed younger in the
first mugshot that she was shown. Based on this positive identification testimony
evidence and the charge that was given, it is not reasonable to conclude that the jury was
misled because of the court's refusal to charge in the specific language requested.
Brief of the State of Connecticut-Appellee at 23, State v. Tillman, 600 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1991) (No.
14085). Indeed, the State referred to the victim's "strong and certain" or "positive" eyewitness
identification testimony at least four times in its brief, in support ofharrn-type arguments.ld. at 23, 27,
30,35.
112. Brief of the Defendant-Appellant, supra note 103, at 1-2 (quoting testimony of Officer
Wood in Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 149).
113. ld. at 2.
114. Id.
lIS. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 746.
116. Id.
117. ld.
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statement reflected consciousness of guilt, because, the prosecution
asserted, at that time no one had told Mr. Tillman that the victim of the
assault had been beaten. I IS Mr. Tillman testified that he had not made
that statement, and also maintained that he had been shown a picture of
the victim's bruised face. 119
On appeal, Mr. Tillman challenged the language "this principle would
apply," assertin~ that it forbade the jury to consider an innocent motive
for the remark. I 0 The court concluded that this claim was not preserved,
because trial counsel had failed to object. 121 It declined to review the
claim under Connecticut doctrine permitting review of unpreserved
constitutional error, reasoning that "[a]n instruction about consciousness
of guilt is not so directly related to an essential element of the crime as
to warrant plenary discussion of whether the 'claim is of constitutional
magnitude alleging a violation of a fundamental right. ",122

4. The Prior Inconsistent Statement Instruction
In his third instructional claim, Mr. Tillman argued that the trial
court's instruction on prior inconsistent statements may have misled the
jury into giving substantive weight to out of court statements that his
alibi witness, Gwendolyn Wilson, gave to police. 123 Ms. Wilson, a
childhood friend of Mr. Tillman's, testified that he had spent the night of
the incident at the home she shared with her boyfriend, who was also a
long-time friend of Mr. Tillman's.124 The trial court had instructed the
jury that, if it found that the witness had said something that
contradicted her testimony in an earlier statement to Detective Kumnick,
and the prior statement was "not in writing or recorded on tape, it may
only be used to test the witness's credit and may not be substituted for
her testimony.,,12S
On cross-examination, the prosecutor had attempted to refresh Ms.
Wilson's recollection using Detective Kumnick's report. 126 The
Detective's report stated that Kumnick had interviewed Ms. Wilson six
days after the crime, and that she had denied that Mr. Tillman had been

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.

(emphasis omitted).
at 746 (citing State v. Golding, 567 A.2d 823, 827 (Conn. 1989».

124. Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 422-25.
125. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 747.
126. Id. at 746 n.1 O.
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at her house on the night of the incident. 127 Mr. Tillman claimed that the
court's instruction on prior inconsistent statements may have misled the
jury into giving Ms. Wilson's statements to the detective-used only in
an unsuccessful attempt to refresh her recollection-substantive
weight. 128
The court concluded that this claim was not preserved, declining to
apply Connecticut doctrine that permits review of unpreserved
constitutional error. 129 The court also rejected Mr. Tillman's claim that
"because these instructions concerned the essential element of identity
and were related to the portions of testimony that were most damaging
to him, taken together they deprived him of a fair trial.,,130 Because each
of these claims alone had been found not to be constitutional error, the
court reasoned, it would not aggregate them to find a constitutional
error. 131
5. The Exclusion ofField Notes Regarding Fingerprints
Finally, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered Mr. Tillman's
claim that the trial court had improperly excluded the field notes of a
police social worker that, he argued, could have supported his claim of
misidentification, or at least demonstrated faulty police investigation.
The social worker's field notes recorded a conversation with Detective
Kumnick "to the effect that fingerprints had been found on the driver's
side of the victim's car, but that they did not belong to the defendant.,,132
At trial, the detective confirmed that the fingerprints found on the car
were not Mr. Tillman's, but he said that the fingerprints were located on
the passenger side of the car. 133 That difference in location was
important, because the victim said that the assailant had used only the
driver's side of her car. 134
Defense counsel attempted to offer the police social worker's field
notes as a business record, but the trial court sustained the State's
hearsay objection and refused to admit them. 135 On appeal, Mr. Tillman
127. Id.
128. Id. at 747.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. The defense moved to compare these unknown prints to those in the state's database.
Record, supra note 77, at 22. This motion was granted, but no match was found. Brief of the DefendantAppellant, supra note 103, at 10.
134. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 747.
135. Id.
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also argued in the alternative that the statement at least should have been
admitted as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the detective. 136
The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected both these arguments: it
limited its review to the business record claim because the prior
inconsistent argument had not been made at trial. l37 It then concluded
that the "defendant made no attempt to lay a proper foundation" to admit
the notes as a business record. 138
Mr. Tillman's conviction was affirmed. Of the five issues raised on
appeal, four were rejected due to a failure to object or to make a proper
evidentiary record. The remaining issue-the eyewitness identification
instruction-was rejected in large part because, in the court's view, the
victim's identification was strong enough that the jury was not misled by
any error.
As we shall see in Part II, the claims raised in Mr. Tillman's appeal
touch on some of the recurring issues of the DNA exonerationsincluding mistaken eyewitness identification, particularly cross-racial
misidentification. In 1991, of course, these factors were not as welldocumented as they are today. At that time, however, one Justice of the
Connecticut Supreme Court dissented from the majority's opinion,
because he believed that Connecticut courts should look more closely at
claims like Mr. Tillman's that undermined public confidence in the
fairness of the system. 139
6. Justice Berdon's Dissent
Justice Berdon dissented from the majority's rejection of Mr.
Tillman's challenge to the jury array.l40 The dissent disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that defense counsel's representation to the court
failed to lay a sufficient evidentiary foundation for Mr. Tillman's jury
array claim. Justice Berdon wrote that he viewed the attorney's
statement as an "offer of proof," by which an attorney represents to the
court that he could prove certain facts if granted an evidentiary hearing.
"Although counsel for the defendant did not articulate that he was
presenting an 'offer of proof,'" wrote Justice Berdon, "it is apparent
from the record that the trial court understood it to be such an offer when
it rejected the challenge to the jury array on the grounds that six jurors

136. [d.

137. Id.
138. [d. at 748.
139. [d. at 752 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
140. [d. at 748 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
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have already been selected .... ,,141 The trial court ruled that "it was too
late to make the claim.,,142
Justice Berdon wrote that, in light of this offer of proof, "the
defendant's constitutional challenge to the array must be reviewed as if
these allegations of the defendant could have been proven at an
evidentiary hearing.,,143 He concluded that he "would find, on the basis
of the offer of proof made by the defendant, that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing to attempt to make a prima facie showing that the
jury array was derived in an unconstitutional manner .... ,,144
Accordingly, Justice Berdon would have reversed and granted Mr.
Tillman a new trial. 145
Justice Berdon criticized the majority opinion as undermining the
perception of fairness in a trial in which an African-American man was
accused of the sexual assault of a white woman. 146 "There is a need to
preserve public confidence in the fairness of a jury," he wrote. 147 "[T]hat
perception dissipates when the court, through its clerk, employs
selection practices for the array that undermines the defendant's
constitutional right to select a jury from a fair cross-section of the
community." 148
B. The Habeas Proceedings
Mr. Tillman's second aPfearance in the Connecticut courts came in
state habeas proceedings.14 Mr. Tillman alleged ineffective assistance
of both trial and appellate counsel. I50 The habeas court reJected both
claims,151 and the Appellate Court of Connecticut affirmed. IS

1. Habeas Court Memorandum of Decision
The Superior Court judge sitting in habeas court issued a
141. [d. at 750.
142. [d.
143. [d.
144. [d. at 748.
145. [d.
146. [d. at 752.
147. [d.
148. [d.
149. See Tillman v. Warden, No. 90844, 1997 WL 374961, at ·1 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 25,
1997), aff'd sub nom. Tillman v. Comm'r ofCorr., 738 A.2d 208 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
150. [d.
151. ld. at *10.
152. See Tillman v. Comm'r ofCorr., 738 A.2d 208 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
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Memorandum of Decision. 153 In it, the habeas court fIrst described the
ineffective assistance of counsel standard, describing it as "highly
deferential," and "indulg[ing] a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance .... ,,154
The habeas court acknowledged that "prior to the petitioner's trial
there had been considerable newspaper coverage of an assault on August
24, 1989 by an African-American male, Daniel Webb, upon a white
female resulting in her death .... Broad news coverage of the details of
the Webb assault heightened the petitioner's concerns in regard to the
racial composition of the jury panel available to serve as the petit jury in
his case.,,135
The habeas court then outlined the jury selection procedure, noting
that trial counsel had challenged the racial composition of the jury
venire, but had failed to request a hearing on the issue. 156 It related that
the jury clerk had testifIed at the habeas hearing and "proffered an
opinion ... that many more minorities than others were excused from
service,,,157 but that this belief was "based on her assumption alone.,,158
Accordingly, it declined to make any factual fInding about the racial
identities of the excused jurors,159 and concluded that even if a hearing
on this issue had been held, it would not have changed jury selection
procedures in Mr. Tillman's case. 160 The habeas court noted approvingly
that trial counsel had "met his professional obligation" of raising Mr.
Tillman's concern, while "candidly providing the court with information
contrary to his main assertion"-specifIcally, that there were AfricanAmerican jurors in the venire next door. 161
The habeas court also rejected the claim that Mr. Tillman's appellate
counsel had been ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court
should have ordered a hearing regarding the jury selection procedures
sua sponte. 162 It reasoned that the factual predicate presented was

153. Tillman, No. 90844, at *1.
154. Id. at *2 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 689-90 (1984».
ISS. Id. at *3 (internal citation omitted). The Hartford Courant reported on the killing of Diane
Gellenbeck and arrest and arraignment of Daniel Webb five times between August 25, 1989, and
September 6, 1989. Mr. Tillman's trial started on September II, 1989.
156. Id. at *3-4.
157. Id. at *6.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at *6-7. The habeas court also rejected a claim by Mr. TiJlman that the jury clerks
exceeded their statutory authority in excusing jurors without judicial authorization. Id. at *7.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *9.
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insufficient to "trigger [this] obligation.,,163

2. Appellate Court Opinion
On appeal to the Appellate Court, Mr. Tillman pressed his claim that
his trial counsel had been ineffective by failing to make an "adequate
offer of proof, or to request an evidentiary hearing or a continuance to
gather proof of unconstitutional jury selection methods.,,164 The court
noted that the only basis for the jury clerk's statement that members of
racial minorities would be disproportionately excused under the
economic hardship policy was the clerk's "speculation and
assumption." 165
Trial counsel testified at the habeas hearing that he had questioned the
jury clerk, and that he had learned that there was a murder trial going on
next door to Mr. Tillman's trial in which there "appeared to be a
substantial number of black jury panel members ... who would have
come from the same array .... ,,166 Based on this observation, the
Appellate court concluded that the trial attorney "investigated,
considered the issue and ultimately decided not to pursue it.,,167 The
court concluded that trial counsel's performance was not deficient, or
even if it was deficient, that Mr. Tillman had not suffered any
prejudice. 168
The Appellate Court also rejected Mr. Tillman's claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel. It concluded that experienced advocates
commonly pick and choose among potential appellate issues, and that it
is reasonable professional judgment not to raise every possible issue on
appeal. 169
Thus, while the Connecticut Supreme Court had rejected Mr.
Tillman's jury array challenge on direct appeal for lack of an evidentiary
record, the Appellate Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief by
deferring to trial counsel's decision not to make that record. This

163. Id.

164. Tillman v. Comm'r ofCorr., 738 A.2d 208, 212 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
165. Id. at 211.
166. Id. at 212.
167. Id. at 212-13.
168. Id. at 212-14. The Appellate Court declined to consider Mr. Tillman's claim that the alleged
jury selection method violated due process because it permitted jurors to be excused by the clerk without
court participation. Id. at 213. Consistent with the theme of preservation, the Appellate Court concluded
that the claim was not raised at trial or on direct appeal, and that Mr. Tillman had failed to meet the
cause and prejudice standard, which would have permitted to him to raise the defaulted claim. Id. at
213-14.
169. Id. at 214.
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somewhat counter-intUitive result is common in postconviction
litigation. l7O The case appeared closed, until Mr. Tillman's exoneration
seven years later.
II.

LINKS TO CAUSES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

Mr. Tillman's case-viewed through the prism of the issues raised on
appeal-illustrates a number of recurring themes in wrongful
convictions. Most salient, it is "yet another" wrongful conviction based
on a mistaken eyewitness identification. 171 It is a cross-racial
identification case involving allegations of a sexual assault leveled by a
white woman against an African-American man. Finally, there are hints
of potential problems with the police investigation and forensic analysis.
A. Mistaken Eyewitness Identification

The appeal is first noteworthy for what it does not claim about the
identification procedure. The identification procedure conducted in Mr.
Tillman's case was challenged at trial in a motion to suppress, which
was denied.172 Like most exonerees whose wrongful convictions were
based on faulty eyewitness testimony, however, Mr. Tillman did not
challenge the identification procedure itself on appeal. 173
The identification procedure was described in the State's brief:
The victim wanted to make an identification of her assailant, and met
with Janette Getz a social worker with the Hartford Police Crisis Unit,
and Detective Kumnick of the Hartford Police Department on January 25,
1988. At headquarters, Detective Kumnick first brought her a set of
170. Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 22, at 126.
171. Posting of Mark Godsey to CrimProf blog, Faulty Photo Id Practice Was the Cause of Yet
Another Wrongfol Conviction, http://lawprofessors.typepad.comlcrimproCblog/2008/04/faulty-phot-id.h
tml (Apr. 17, 2008). See, e.g., Steve McGonigle & Jennifer Emily, DNA Evidence Clears Another
Dallas County Inmate, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 15,2008, available at http://www.dallasnews.co
mlsharedcontentldws/dnilatestnews/stories/041608dnmetdna.68a4egef.html (describing how Clifford
McGowan, Jr., false Iy accused of rape based on a mistaken eyewitness identification, was freed after 23
years. Mr. McGowan was the 16th Dallas County prisoner to be exonerated.).
172. Record, supra note 77, at 18-21. In his ruling from the bench denying Mr. Tillman's Motion
to Suppress the victim's identification, the trial court referred six times to the victim's "certainty" or to
the fact that she was "positive." Transcript on Hearing to the Motion to Suppress Identification at 13236, State v. Tillman, 600 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1991) (No. 53889).
173. Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 22, at 76 (noting that in only 28% (29) of the 104
cases (with written decisions) supported by eyewitness identification, DNA exonerees whose
convictions were supported by faulty eyewitness testimony raised due process claims challenging
eyewitness identifications. 45% (47) raised some kind of claim challenging an eyewitness identification.
Mr. Tillman counts among those who did raise some kind of claim challenging the eyewitness
identification, because he raised the jury instruction issue).
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Polaroid pictures of black men, but the victim did not recognize any of
the individuals.
Detective Kurnnick then handed her a book of police photographs. He
left the victim with Getz, and, shortly thereafter, the victim recognized a
picture of her attacker, which caused her to shake and cry. She told Getz
that she recognized her attacker but that he looked younger in the picture.
Detective Kurnnick came back in and said he would try to get a more
recent photo. The first picture was dated April, 1983. Detective Kurnnick
returned with another picture of the defendant taken in June, 1987. The
victim identified this picture and had no doubt that it was the man who
had attacked her. At trial the victim identified the defendant as her
assailant and stated that there was no question in her mind as to his
identity. 174

Indeed, the trial transcript reveals that the victim testified (at both the
hearing on the motion to suppress and before the jury) that the first
photo of Mr. Tillman that she picked "looked a little different" or
"looked different" from her assailant. 175 The trial transcript also reveals
that, before showing the victim the photographs, the Detective instructed
her that "people can shave, they can grow beards," and that she should
point out a photograph even if "she saw someone that was not perfect[that] had similar features.,,176
This account of the identification procedures suggests some potential
"red flags" based on today's social science. Current "best practices"
caution against conducting multiple identification procedures with the
same suspect. 177 The detective's remarks may also be cause for concern.
A recent study of a similar "appearance change" instruction revealed
that "the rate of mistaken identifications of an innocent suspect was
174. Brief of the State of Connecticut-Appellee, supra note III, at 5 (internal citations omitted).
175. Transcript on Hearing of the Motion to Suppress Identification, supra note 172, at 43, 44;
Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 97.
176. The Detective testified about his instructions to the victim, prior to showing her suspects'
photographs:
I told her that I was going to show her photographs of black males. And I asked her to
study the photographs, remembering that people can shave, they can grow beards, we
may not have a photograph of the person exactly as he appeared. So I just told her to
study the faces. If she saw the person, tell us. If she saw someone that was not perfecthad similar features, point those out so we know what we're looking for.
Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 193. Current research counsels that victims should be cautioned that
the true culprit may not appear in the photo array or lineup. Wells, supra note 33, at 625.
177. Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and
the Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. I, 8 (2009) ("Witnesses who encountered a innocent person's photo in an initial identification
procedure were more likely to misidentify a different photo of him in a second procedure even if they
did not misidentify him in the first procedure, but the effect is especially strong if they also misidentified
the person in the first procedure.").
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inflated by over 50%" when witnesses were given the instruction. 178
Also troubling is the victim's initial statement that, in the first
photograph, Mr. Tillman "looked younger in the picture" or "looked a
little different." 179 Were the victim's expressions of confidence,
particularly her statements of certainty at trial, inflated by suggestive or
successive identification procedures, or by the trial process itself'?180
In the twenty years since Mr. Tillman's trial, social scientists have
learned a great deal about eyewitness evidence, and in particular the
relationship between confidence and accuracy. Professor Gary L. Wells
and others have demonstrated that the correlation between accuracy and
confidence is "not a reliable indicator of accuracy,,,181 or as Professor
Wells and his co-author Deah Quinlivan recently wrote, that certainty is
of "limited utility" in judging the reliability of an identification. 182 Even
more important, social scientists have learned that an eyewitness's
assessment of certainty is "highly malleable" and can be "inflated" by
suggestive identification procedures,183 or even by more innocuous
influences like encouraging post-identification "feedback" or repeated

178. Steve D. Charman & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Lineups: Is the Appearance-Change
Instruction a Good Idea?, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 18 (2007). Professors Charman and Wells
suggest that this might be because the instruction inappropriately encourages witnesses who have a
"poor memory of the criminal" to make a pick anyway. Id.
179. See Transcript on Hearing of the Motion to Suppress Identification, supra note 172, at 43, 44;
Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 97.
180. Id. Alternatively, the victim's remarks might hint at a relative judgment effect: a
psychological process by which a witness selects "the member of the lineup [or photo array] who most
resembles the eyewitness's memory of the culprit relative to the other members of the lineup," even if
the real culprit is absent. Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological
Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 765, 768-69 (1995). The detective
in the Tillman case testified that he told the victim to alert the police to any photos that "look similar" or
possess "similar features" to the suspect, so that the police could develop a description. Trial Transcript,
supra note 4, at 193, 194. Could the victim have "settled" for the suspect who looked most like her
assailant?
181. See Gary L. Wells, Elizabeth A. Olson & Steve D. Charman, The Confidence ofEyewitnesses
in Their Identifications from Lineups, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 151, 151 (2002).
Professor Wells and his co-authors explain that "the confidence-accuracy correlation might be as high as
+.40 when the analysis is restricted to individuals who make an identification." Id. at 152. They
analogize this relationship to the "correlation between a person's height and a person's gender,"
reasoning that, "we would expect to encounter a highly confident mistaken eyewitness ... about as often
as we would encounter a tall female (or a short male)." Id. See also Neil Brewer, Amber Keast &
Amanda Rishworth, The Confidence-Accuracy Relationship in Eyewitness Identification: The Effects of
Refiection and Disconfirmation on Correlation and Calibration, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 44
(2002); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer Anything About
Their Relationship?, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243, 253 (1980); Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness
Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L.
817(1995).
182. Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 177, at 12.
183. Jd. at 9.
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questioning. 184 Thus, certainty statements made by a victim at trial are of
less value than statements made at the time of the identification, because
the victim's subjective level of certainty may be tainted by factors "such
as the witness' beliefs about other evidence against the accused or their
beliefs about what others believe.,,185
In Mr. Tillman's case, an eyewitness who initially said that the
suspect "looked different" or "younger" in the first photograph,186
identified him from a second, more recent photograph, described her
level of certainty as "positive,,,187 and, at trial, expressed no doubt that
Mr. Tillman was her assailant. 188 This sequence of events-involving
multiple

photographs

instruction,

of

and reliance

Mr.

Tillman,

an

"appearance

change"

on the victim's subjective statements of

certainty, which became more definitive with successive identification
procedures-may

reflect

in part

the

certainty described by Professor Wells.

"malleability" of eyewitness
189
Alternatively, it may simply

demonstrate the weak correlation between certainty and accuracy. 190 At
a minimum, it suggests a need to reexamine procedures for interacting
with eyewitnesses,191 a process that has been initiated in Connecticut, 192

184. See Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 360
(1998). See also Amy L. Bradfield, Gary L. Wells, & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Damaging Effect of
Confirming Feedback on the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J.
ApPLIED PSYCHOL. 112 (2002); Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence & Witness
Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 817, 827 (1995); Carolyn
Semmler, Neil Brewer & Gary L. Wells, Effects of Postidentification Feedback on Eyewitness
Identification and Nonidentification Confidence, 89 J. ApPLIED PSYCHOL. 334 (2004).
185. Wells & Quinlivan. supra note 177, at 18.
186. Transcript on Hearing of the Motion to Suppress Identification, supra note 172, at 43, 44;
Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 97.
187. Id. See also Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 195 (Detective Kumnick testified that, "[s]he

said she was positive it was him, although in the photograph he looked younger than he actually was.").
188. Tillman v. State, 600 A.2d 738, 745 (Conn. 1991).
189. Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 177, at 12.
190. See sources cited supra note 184. See also Wells, Memon & Penrod, supra note 33, at 65.
191. See Wells, Memon & Penrod, supra note 33, at 68 (counseling, inter alia, that lineup
administrators "obtain[] a confidence statement from the eyewitness before external factors can
influence the person's confidence"); see also Wells, supra note 33.
192. In the State v. Ledbetter case in 2005 the Connecticut Supreme Court mandated that "unless
there is no significant risk of misidentification," in cases in which the victim was not advised by police
that a suspect mayor may not be in a line-up or photo array, trial courts should instruct the jury that:
Psychological studies have shown that indicating to a witness that a suspect is present in
an identification procedure or failing to warn the witness that the perpetrator mayor may
not be in the procedure increases the likelihood that the witness will select one of the
individuals in the procedure, even when the perpetrator is not present.
881 A.2d 290, 318 (Conn. 2005). At around the same time, law enforcement authorities adopted fonn
instructions for police officers to use in administering identification procedures. Alex Woods, New Rules
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but not yet brought to complete fruition. 193
On appeal, Mr. Tillman did not press his due process challenge to the
eyewitness identification procedure itself. However, he raised an issue
relating to the identification-a challenge to the jury instruction about
factors that the jurors could consider in evaluating the victim's
identification. In rejecting this claim, the opinion in State v. Tillman
relies heavily on the victim's subjective assessment of her opportunity to
view her assailant. The Court says that the victim "was able to get a
good look at [her attacker's] face," and that "[d]uring the entire fifteen
to twenty minutes that the attacker was having difficulty starting the car,
the victim observed the right side of his face.,,194 The opinion quotes the
victim's testimony that she "was trying to focus on his eyes, nose, the
shape of his face, things that I could remember, things that I would be
able to use to identify him by.,,195
The opinion also focuses on the victim's subjective statements of
certainty about her identification. It says that she "was certain she could
identify her attacker" from the photo array, and that the victim testified
at trial that there was "no doubt in her mind that the defendant was the
man who had attacked her."I96
Unfortunately, despite the social science research, this type of
reliance on the victim's subjective statements of certainty still forms the
basis of important legal standards relating to eyewitness identification
procedures. The 1977 U.S. Supreme Court decision establishing the
standard for due process challenges to identification procedures, Manson
v. Brathwaite/ 97 instructs courts to admit even identifications that are
Sept. 23,2005, available at http://ww
w.nacdl.orglsl_docs.nsflfreefonniEyewitnessIDO 17.
193. A comprehensive eyewitness identification bill that would have mandated reforms including
sequential double-blind procedures was introduced into the General Assembly in early 2008, but was not
adopted. An Act Concerning Eyewitness Identification, H.R. 5832, 2008 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Conn. 2008). Another eyewitness identification reform bill was introduced in 2009, but at the time this
Article was being finalized, it had not advanced beyond a public hearing. An Act Concerning
Eyewitness Identification, S.B. 357, 2009 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2009). See also State v.
Marquez, 967 A.2d 56, 84 (Conn. 2009) (declining to exercise supervisory authority to implement
reforms to eyewitness identification procedures).
194. Tillman v. State, 600 A.2d 738, 745 (Conn. 1991).

Being Drawn/or Eyewitness Identification, JOURNAL-INQUIRER,

195. !d.
196. Id.

The police report reprinted in the Record on Appeal contains even more such statements
from the victim, including a statement "that she would never forget the face of the black male who raped
and robbed her." Record, supra note 77, at 7. At trial, the victim's mistaken identification was
compounded by the fact that then-existing Connecticut precedent permitted other witnesses to repeat her
version of events: the victim's advocate and the Detective both essentially repeated her account of the
rape. Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 129-31,190. Five years after the opinion in Mr. Tillman's case,
the Connecticut Supreme Court limited such constancy testimony to the fact that the victim had reported
the assault to the witness. State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 304 (1996).
197. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
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the product of suggestive procedures if they are nonetheless reliable. 198
Reliability is to be judged by five factors: "the opportunity of the
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree
of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the
criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation." 199
The Manson standard has been criticized. 2oo In a recent article, Gary
Wells and Deah Quinlivan explain that "the most serious problem is that
three of the five [Manson] criteria (certainty, view, and attention) are
self-reports by the eyewitnesses.,,201 They further caution that these
"self-reports" might be artificially enhanced "products of suggestive
procedures.,,202 Wells and Quinlivan conclude that these three Manson
factors actually might be better "indicators of the power of the
suggestive procedure" than indicators of the ultimate reliability of the
identification. 203 Despite such criticism, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
yet abandoned Manson, and the Connecticut Supreme Court has
declined to adopt a different standard under the state constitution. 204
The instruction on eyewitness identification given by the trial court at
Mr. Tillman's trial told the jury to consider some of the same factors that
make up the reliability prong of Manson, including the criticized factors
that are based on the witness' subjective assessment of their accuracy.205
Mr. Tillman's requested instruction would have told the jury that it
could have considered whether the victim was "physically impaired or
under stress when she observed the perpetrator" in evaluating the
reliability of her identification. 206
It is hard to say whether Mr. Tillman's proposed instruction would
have focused the jury more keenly on the potential for mistaken
eyewitness identification, although admittedly it seems unlikely.207
198. Id. at 114.
199. Id.
200. See Wells &

Quinlivan, supra note 177; see also O'Toole & Shay, supra note 33.
201. Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 177, at 16.
202. !d.
203. Id. at 17.
204. State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 308-14 (Conn.
Mistaken Identity: Advice to Connecticut Counsel Following

2005). See Lisa J. Steele, Trying Cases of
State v. Ledbetter, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REv.

799,802 (2007).
205. Specifically, jurors were instructed to consider "opportunity to observe" and "certainty," as
well as less-controversial factors including the time between the incident and the identification, and the
level of consistency between the description and the defendant's appearance. Brief of the DefendantAppellant, supra note 103, at app. F-4.
206. Tillman v. State, 600 A.2d 738, 744 (Conn. 1991).
207. See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 177, at 20 (arguing that jury instructions that are "tailored

2009]

MR. TILLMAN'S CASE

1531

Commentators have noted that it is nearly impossible to expose the
flaws in an identification when the mistaken witness-often a crime
victim who has undergone a horrible ordeal-is so certain of her pick. 208
In addition, studies demonstrate that jurors are persuaded by an
apparently certain witness. 209
We do know that Mr. Tillman's jury was focused on the issue of the
identification, because it asked for the victim's two descriptions of her
assailant to be read back to them during deliberations. 2lo Similar
instructional issues were being litigated in other cases around the time of
Mr. Tillman's trial,2l1 and continue to be litigated in Connecticut,212
sometimes in cases involving questionable identification practices.
Most significant here, the opinIOn in Mr. Tillman's appeal
demonstrates over-reliance on the victim's subjective expressions of
certainty (particularly those made at trial), as well as her own assessment
to the specific case," for example letting the jury know that it can consider a specific suggestive factor
that was present in the identification procedure, might be effective). But see Penrod & Cutler, supra note
181, at 834 (arguing that there is "little evidence that judges' instructions concerning the reliability of
eyewitness identification improve juror decision making").
208. Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn't: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the
Limits o/Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 772 (2007) (explaining why cross-examination
is relatively ineffectual in uncovering truly mistaken eyewitness identifications); Wells & Quinlivan,
supra note 177, at 17 ("[C)areful questioning at the Manson hearing is not likely to get around this
problem."). See Steele, supra note 204. at 802 ("No amount of skillful cross-examination was going to
shake the witness' story because, as far as they were concerned, it was true. The witness will come
across as sympathetic, honest, and persuasive despite having made a dreadful error.").
209. Penrod & Cutler, supra note 181, at 822 ("Jurors appear to overestimate the accuracy of
identifications ... do not distinguish accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses, and are generally
insensitive to factors that influence eyewitness identification accuracy."). See also JAMES M. DOYLE,
TRUE WITNESS 44 (2005) ("Research indicates that ... mock jurors believe a confident but mistaken
eyewitness at exactly the same rate as a confident and correct one when viewing conditions are in the
same general range."); Epstein, supra note 208, at 773.
210. Brief of the Defendant-Appellant, supra note 103, at 15.
211. Only a few months before issuing its opinion in Mr. Tillman's case, the court rejected a
challenge to the adequacy of an instruction in a case in which two witnesses identified the defendant in
the context of a probable cause hearing, after having first picked another man from a photo array. See
State v. Tatum, 595 A.2d 322 (Conn. 1991). While conceding in a footnote that "it is true that a trial
court's refusal to give any special instruction whatsoever on the dangers inherent in eyewitness
identification constitutes reversible error where 'the conviction of the defendant [turns] upon the
testimony of eyewitness who were uncertain, unclear or inconsistent, '" the court concluded that the
instruction that was given-which like the instruction in Mr. Tillman's case told the jury to focus in part
on certainty and opportunity to observe-was adequate. Id. at 329 & n.18, 330-31 (citing, inter alia,
State v. Harden, 398 A.2d 1169, 1173 (Conn. 1978». At least one commentator has noted that, under
this standard, "if the trial court finds the identification to be reliable at the motion to suppress stage and
the witness's testimony is moderately strong, then a specific jury instruction is not required." Steele,
supra note 204, at 844.
212. Steele, supra note 204, at 849 & n.238. Steele writes that the Connecticut court "has
consistently upheld trial courts' denials of requested jury instructions focusing on specific weaknesses in
eyewitness identification." Id. at 849 (relying on the case notes collected in BORDEN & ORLAND, supra
note 72, §§ 3.14-.15).

1532

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

of her opportunity to view the culprit. 213 While the most important
changes relating to eyewitness identification must happen at the
investigative level,214 courts also should reduce reliance on confidence
as a proxy for accuracy.
B. Cross-Racial Identification and Racial Disparity
The statements of the victim in State v. Tillman eerily echo those of
the victim in another rape case resulting in a wrongful conviction, the
case of Ronald Cotton. In that case, the victim, Jennifer Thompson, has
spoken publicly and written about how she made every effort to
remember her rapist's features so that she could identify him.215 She was
shocked to learn 11 years later that she had been mistaken when she had
identified Mr. Cotton, who was exonerated by DNA. 216
Like Tillman, the Cotton case was a cross-racial mistaken
identification in a sexual assault in which a white woman accused an
African-American man of rape.2I7 Cross-racial identifications like those
in the Tillman and Cotton cases are even more prone to error than other
kinds of eyewitness identifications. Almost half of the DNA
exonerations involved a cross-racial identification. 218 Social scientists
debate the causes of "own-race bias" in identification of faces but
describe the effect as "robUSt.,,219 The effect has been described as an
"unconscious and automatic" psychological process. 220 Commentators
have urged courts to adopt special instructions on cross-racial
eyewitness identification,22I but so far Connecticut, like most
213. Tillman v. State, 600 A.2d 738, 745 (Conn. 1991).
214. See supra note 33. But see State v. Marquez, 967 A.2d 56, 84 (Conn. 2009) (declining to
implement eyewitness identification procedure reforms under the court's supervisory authority).
215. Jennifer Thompson, 'I Was Certain, but I Was Wrong', N.Y. TIMES, June 18,2000. At Mr.
Tillman's trial, the victim advocate who testified for the State said that the victim had told her that she
had made a "conscious effort" to look at her attacker so that she could identify him. Trial Transcript,
supra note 4, at 131. The prosecutor then emphasized in closing that the victim had repeatedly focused
on looking at the attacker. Id. at 486-87. See also JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO & RONALD COTION
WITH ERIN TORNEO, PICKING COTION: OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE & REDEMPTION 213, 237-38
(2009).
216. Thompson, supra note 215.
217. Id.

218. Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 22, at 79.
219. Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias
in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 3, 3 (2001). See also
Aaronson, supra note 43; Wells, Mermon & Penrod, supra note 33, at 52.
220. Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 121, 124 (2006).
221. See Aaronson, supra note 43 (proposing a model jury instruction on cross-racial eyewitness
identification). The American Bar Association House of Delegates recently passed a resolution urging
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jurisdictions,222 has declined to mandate such an instruction. 223
In general, members of racial minorities are disproportionately
represented among the wrongfully convicted. 224 The disproportionate
racial impact of wrongful convictions parallels other racial disparities in
our criminal justice system-uneven arrest and charging rates, disparate
sentences, and racial disproportion in incarceration rates?25 In a study of
exonerations between 1989 and 2003, almost half involved an AfricanAmerican man wrongly accused of raping a white woman. 226
Again, commentators debate the reasons,227 just as they debate the
causes of other kinds of racial inequity in our criminal justice system. 228
Factors contributing to the disparity in wrongful convictions could
include racially-discriminatory jury selection methods, selective
prosecution, unconscious racism by actors in the criminal justice system,
racially-biased interrogation techniques-in addition to the potential for
jurisdictions to make available adequate funding for expert testimony on cross-racial identification, and
to create model jury instructions for such cases. See Stephen J. Saltzburg, Report to House of Delegates,
200S A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. L. REp. I, available at http://www.abanet.orgicrimjustipolicy/amOSI04
d.pdf.
222. The ABA report accompanying its recommendation stated that the jurisdictions that currently
"require or authorize a cross-racial identification jury instruction" are California, Utah, New Jersey, and
Massachusetts. Id. at 12. It also concluded that "[m]ost state appellate courts have yet to address this
issue." !d.
223. See State v. Porter, 69S A.2d 739, 779 n.SO (Conn. 1997) ("This court has specifically
rejected the notion of special treatment for defendants in cross-racial identification situations ....");
State v. Wiggins, SI3 A.2d 1056, lOSS-59 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to
give requested instruction on cross-racial identification). See also BORDEN & ORLAND, supra note 72,
§ 3.14, at 204. The year after the Connecticut Supreme Court's opinion in Mr. Tillman's case, Justice
Berdon dissented in another cross-racial eyewitness identification case in which the court cited its
opinion in Tillman. He argued that "[a] miscarriage of justice could result if we allow the jury to use
eyewitness identification evidence without proper guidance from the trial court's instructions alerting
the jury to the factors to consider in its evaluation." State v. Cerilli, 610 A.2d 1130, 1147 (Conn. 1992)
(Berdon, 1., dissenting).
224. Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 22, at 66--67.
225. Karen F. Parker, Mari A. Dewees & Michael L. Radelet, Racial Bias and the Conviction of
the Innocent, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 115-16.
226. Samuel R. Gross, Kristen Jacoby, Daniel J. Matheson, Nicholas Montgomery & Sujata Patil,
Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 547-4S
(2005). See also Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 22, at 67 ("73% of innocent rape convicts were
Black or Hispanic, while one study indicates that only 37% of all rape convicts are minorities").
227. See generally Taslitz, supra note 220. See also Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux:
How Race Contributes to Convicting the Innocent: The Informants Example, 37 SW. L. REv. 1091
(200S).
22S. See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REv. 1970, 1970 (200S) (observing in
the abstract that racial inequality appears to be a "core feature of American criminal justice," but that its
"causes remain obscure."); Andrew E. Taslitz, Foreward: The Political Geography of Race Data in the
Criminal Justice System, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1,2-3 (Summer 2003) (recounting debate among
criminal law professors about the cases of racial disparity, positing causes ranging from "fair application
of neutral legal principles" resulting in disparate impact to "subconscious racial stereotyping or systemic
forces.").
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error in cross-racial eyewitness identification. 229 In Mr. Tillman's case
an erroneous cross-racial identification occurred,230 and racially-biased
jury selection was alleged.
Commentators have noted the potential for multiple forms of racial
bias to interact and exacerbate (or at least fail to correct) one another. 231
An accuser could mistakenly identify a defendant, and her mistake may
be attributable in part to unintentional "own-race bias.,,232 The victim's
initial mistake may be compounded by unconscious racism in the
investigation and prosecution;233 at trial;234 or even on appeal or in
postconviction proceedings. 235 Of course, it is impossible to say whether
and to what extent unconscious stereotyping may have played a role in
Mr. Tillman's wrongful conviction, but his case challenges us to
consider these questions. 236
C. Faulty Investigation and Forensic Analysis

Lurking between the lines of the published opinions in Mr. Tillman's
case are questions about the police investigation in his case. 237 The
hearsay issue raised on appeal pertained to a police social worker's notes
229.
230.

Taslitz, supra note 220, at 122, 130.
Racial issues can also produce more overt suggestivity. At trial, defense counsel asked the
victim, who had just identified Mr. Tillman as her assailant, "Do you see any other black men in this
courtroom?" Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 119.
231. Taslitz, supra note 220, at 131-33 (noting that "multi-stage dynamics [of racial bias] may be
reinforcing").
232. See Meissner & Brigham, supra note 219. The photos of Mr. Tillman used in the
identification procedure were police photos. Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 194. Another question that
merits inquiry is whether, in light of the fact that African-American men may be subjected to more
interactions with police than other groups, see Taslitz, supra note 220, at 127-28, the use ofresulting
arrest photos in such identification procedures exposes them to a heightened risk of wrongful conviction.
233. Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role o/the Prosecutor,
39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 1. REv. 202, 203 (2007) (arguing that "[u]nwarranted racial disparities cannot be
eliminated without the active participation of prosecutors").
234. Taslitz, supra note 220, at 126-28. See also Sherri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification
Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL 1. REV. 934, 949 (1984) (arguing based on social science
research that "when the evidence is sparse, jurors are more likely to attribute guilt to defendants of a
different race").
235. Cf Taslitz, supra note 220, at 133 ("There is no reason to think that similar [racially biased]
dynamics will have any less force at other steps in the process.").
236. Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity o/Color-Blind Criminal Justice, 5 OIDO
ST. J. CRIM. 1. I, 3 (2007) (using the term "racial blindsight" to describe that "much of America is
consciously blind to the harmful effect of racial biases on our individual and collective psychologies, yet
is at some subconscious level quite aware of their presence ... [and] ... that this blindsight is caused by
trauma").
237. Mr. Tillman's story also illustrates the potential for false confession. Mr. Tillman testified at
trial that the police told him (falsely) that they had his fmgerprints and that they urged him to confess--a
suggestion that he resisted. Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 446.
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of a conversation with a detective that placed certain key fingerprintswhich did not match Mr. Tillman-on the driver's side of the car.238 At
trial, the officer testified that those fingerprints were on the passenger
side, which was never used by the rapist. 239 The defense was not
permitted to introduce the police social worker's notes as a business
record to support its claim that Mr. Tillman was not the real perpetrator,
or that the police investigation was faulty.240
The phenomenon of "tunnel vision" can cause investigators and
prosecutors to discount evidence that does not fit their hypothesis of
guilt. 241 "Tunnel vision" has been described as the interaction of
cognitive processes including "confirmation bias," "hindsight bias," and
"outcome bias.,,242 Professor Keith Findley has suggested that the same
cognitive processes that produce tunnel vision in police and prosecutors
are also at work in the appellate process, encouraging appellate courts to
deem errors "harmless" because they are convinced of a defendant's
guilt. 243
Another "dog that did not bark" in Mr. Tillman's case was that no
challenge was brought to the forensic science evidence introduced at
trial-specifically the serology evidence. A review of the transcripts of
exonerees whose convictions were supported by forensic evidence,
conducted by Professor Garrett and Peter Neufeld, demonstrates that, at
the majority of these trials, the testimony of the prosecution's forensic
analysts was improper. 244 Professor Garrett has pointed out that the
forensic analyst who testified at Mr. Tillman's trial inaccurately
characterized the blood evidence. 245 Like most exonerees whose
convictions were based on faulty forensic evidence, Mr. Tillman did not
challenge the forensic evidence on appeal or in postconviction

238. State v. Tillman, 600 A.2d 738, 747 (Conn. 1991).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions 0/ Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 308-22 (2006). See also Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive
Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2N.V.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 512 (2007); Martin, supra note 66; Daniel
S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims o/Innocence, 84 B.U.
L. REV. 125, 147-50 (2004).
242. Findley & Scott, supra note 241, at 324-25.
243. Id. at 349-50.
244. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 28.

245. The forensic analyst maintained that the stain on the victim's pantyhose could have been left
by only 20% of the popUlation, and failed to acknowledge the possibility that the testing could have been
inconclusive due to degradation of the sample or insufficient material to test (the likely reality). See
Emails from Brandon Garrett to author (May 22, 2008 & July 2, 2008) (on file with author); see also
Trial Transcript, supra note 4, at 317-27.
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proceedings. 246
III. STATE V. TILLMAN AS A CASE STUDY OF APPEALS PROCESS
Now that Mr. Tillman's wrongful conviction has come to light, we
are left with two published opinions that tell a story that is not true, and
affirm a result that was a miscarriage of justice. Yet these opinions are
still "good law" in Connecticut, and even have been cited in an opinion
rejecting the appeal of another Connecticut prisoner who subsequently
was exonerated based on DNA.247 This situation provides an occasion to
consider the role of appellate courts and the nature of appellate
reasoning.
It is a commonplace observation that appeals are not really about guilt
and innocence. 248 Professor Findley has noted that this realization often
produces surprise among lay people. 249 Appellate courts' role is not to
second-guess the factual determinations of juries and trial judges, the
standard line goes. 250 Appeals courts lack the "institutional competence"
to make factual determinations: they do not observe the witnesses and
the courtroom dynamics. 251 The role of appellate courts, according to
conventional wisdom, is to announce legal principles and consider
whether trial procedures complied with them, not to second-guess the
accuracy of factual determinations. 252 Of course, another more
"instrumentalist" goal of our adjudicative system as a whole, as
described by Professor Charles Nesson, might be simply "authoritative
resolution ... with ascertainment of the truth but a useful means to that
246. Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 22, at 76 (none of the 77 exonerees whose cases (with
written opinions) were based on faulty forensic evidence brought a direct constitutional challenge to that
evidence; 25 (32%) brought some type of claim challenging that evidence, but only 6 of these won
relief).
247. See supra notes 69-70.
248. Findley & Scott, supra note 241, at 348.
249. Id.
250. Id. See also

State v. Rivera, 810 A.2d 824, 831 (Conn. 2002) ("[I]t is beyond question that
the trier offact, here, the jury, is the arbiter of credibility. This cou.t does not sit as an additional juror to
reconsider the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses."). See also Chad M. Oldfather, Appel/ate
Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 V AND. L. REV. 437, 438-39
(2004)("Among the pieties of our legal system is the notion that appellate courts do not engage in
factual evaluation .... Simply put, we believe that appellate courts are not very good at fact finding.").
251. Findley & Scott, supra note 241, at 366. Recently, for example, the Connecticut Appellate
Court remarked, "[a]lthough we do recognize the inconsistencies in Henry's testimony and how it
differs from the testimony of Ware, it is not within the scope of our authority to assess for ourselves the
credibility of the witnesses." State v. McCarthy, 939 A.2d 1195, 1204 (Conn. 2008).
252. Findley & Scott, supra note 241, at 348-49,366. See also Lissa Griffin, The Correction of
Wrongfol Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. iNT'L. L. REV. 1241, 1272 (2001) ("the
scope of review in [American appellate] courts is limited to legal as opposed to factual errors").
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end.,,253
In the wake of the DNA exonerations, some have called for a
rethinking of appellate and postconviction courts' role. Professor
Findley, building on the work of Professor Chad Oldfather,254 has
argued that appellate courts are not really so poorly-situated to make
some types of factual determinations, and that they should not
necessarily defer to trial courtS. 255 Professor Garrett has called for more
avenues for review of postconviction innocence claims, free of the
procedural obstacles that limit much of postconviction litigation in the
name of "finality.,,256 Still others have gone further and questioned the
utility of an adversary system of litigation. 257
My proposals are more modest, but I also consider the DNA
exonerations to be an opportunity to reflect on appellate courts' mission.
I submit that it is not only lay people who feel a sense of cognitive
dissonance when confronted with the Tillman opinions. Certainly,
despite all of the shared understanding of appellate courts' limited role,
the opinions in Mr. Tillman's case produce a feeling that something in
the appellate process has misfired. State v. Tillman can hardly be
described as a good outcome.
The Tillman opinions call into question the nature of the conversation
between appellate lawyers and judges in state court systems. Appellate
advocates carefully craft alternative narratives about cases-why an

253. Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity,
92 HARV. L. REv. 1187,1194-95 (1979).
254. Oldfather, supra note 250, at 463--67.
255. Findley & Scott, supra note 241, at 366-67. Writing for the Connecticut Supreme Court in
State v. Hammond, Justice Peters noted commentary arguing that "the trial court's superior ability to
view the trial and assess the witnesses' credibility can be given excessive weight on review." 604 A.2d
793, 796 n.2 (citing Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges and the Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153,217-18 (1989». I thank Professor
Timothy Everett for this note and many other reflections on Connecticut precedent.
256. Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629 (2008) [hereinafter Garrett,
Claiming Innocence]. The proper role of federal courts reviewing state criminal convictions in federal
habeas corpus proceedings (not an issue in Mr. Tillman's case) is discussed extensively in scholarly
commentary. See Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, supra note 59 (discussing the debate
sparked by Professor Paul Bator regarding whether federal habeas proceedings should focus on ensuring
fair process or determining truth) (citing Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1963».
257. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1587 (2005) (describing the emergence ofa "new model
for criminal justice" that depends "less on adversarial process" and "more on practices akin to those
found in administrative and inquisitorial settings"); Daniel Givelber, The Adversary System and
Historical Accuracy: Can We Do Better?, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED
JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 253; Griffm, supra note 252, at 1303 (calling for the creation of an
independent commission, like that in the United Kingdom, to review "credible new evidence of
innocence" after other appeals have concluded).
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error was harmful, what evidence made a difference, what concerned the
jury. Appeals courts, based on briefs, transcript, and record, develop
views about which errors made a difference, and in what circumstances
it is worthwhile to reaffirm or announce a legal principle. Mr. Tillman's
case challenges us to ask whether this conversation between appellate
advocates and judges bears any relationship to facts in the world. Is it
truly divorced from questions of guilt or innocence? If so, is it, as
Professor Kamin has su~~ested, no more than an "argu[ment] over the
plot of a good novel"? 8 Are appellate courts' opinions-with their
conclusions about the reliability of verdicts-"no better than science
fiction,,?259
The notion that appellate courts exist to elucidate abstract principles
of law does not describe the totality of the work of the state appellate
courts. State court opinions arply tests that focus heavily on various
kinds of harm and prejudice. 26 They often wade into the factual details
of a case. And state supreme courts rightly view themselves as
possessing supervisory authority over a criminal justice system,261 an
authority that the Connecticut courts have used over the years. 262
Nonetheless, the Tillman case illustrates some dynamics that can
hinder appellate courts from fulfilling their role in leading a state's
criminal process. While different decisions might not have changed the
result in the Tillman trial, reexamining certain features of appellate
practice might reduce the likelihood of wrongful conviction over the
long-term. These aspects of appellate judging include heavy reliance on
preservation rules and on harm- and prejudice-type analyses. 263 Overuse of these tools can signal to players in the criminal justice system that
they can gloss over certain issues with little risk of reversal-courting
disaster.
A. "The Lawyer Failed": Preservation and Making an Adequate Record

The issue that was the primary focus of Mr. Tillman's appeal was his
claim of racial discrimination in the composition of the jury pool. The
Connecticut Supreme Court majority concluded that counsel had failed
258.

Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1,21 (2002).
259. Id.
260. Garrett, Harmless Error, supra note 49.
261. See MEADOR ET AL., supra note 61 (identifying the three roles of appellate courts as error
correction, harmonization of the law, and supervision of trial courts in the jurisdiction).
262. See supra notes 64 and 65.
263. Which harm standard is used (and more generally which standard of review is employed) has
an impact on the rigor of appellate review, but I focus here on two very general observations inspired by
the Tillman opinions.
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to create an adequate evidentiary record in support of this claim. 264 In
dissent, Justice Berdon argued that counsel's representation regarding
the jury clerk's comments should have been treated as an offer of proof;
that the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing; and that the
Connecticut Supreme Court should have ordered a new trial. 265
Nonetheless, counsel was not found ineffective for failing to make an
adequate record. 266
It is common for state appeals courts to dispose of claims for lack of
preservation or failure to make an adequate record. There are a number
of different issues at stake-failure to object or make a legal argument,
failure to ensure sufficient memorialization of what transpired at trial,
and failure to make an adequate "offer of proof' or request an
evidentiary hearing. 267 The opinion in Mr. Tillman's case focuses on
counsel's failings, not on problems with the evidence itself.268 In this
section, when I use the term "preservation rules," I am referring loosely
to situations in which the court rejects an appellate claim because
counsel has failed to do something-to offer evidence, to object, or to
raise an issue.
Connecticut does permit review of unpreserved constitutional claims
on direct appeal; however, the four-part test used for unpreserved
constitutional error requires that the record be adequate for review
(which as we have seen may provide an "out"), and incorporates a harm
standard (which as discussed below may undercut searching review).269
Plain error review is available, but rarely accorded: many appeals
continue to founder based on inadequate preservation. 27o Indeed,
particularly at the intermediate Appellate Court level, litigants
frequently have been denied appellate review for failing to seek

264. State v. Tillman, 600 A.2d 738, 742 (Conn. 1991). To be fair, the Connecticut Supreme
Court did reject a threshold procedural claim by the government that the defendant had failed to comply
with a Practice Book provision requiring that challenges to the jury array be made within five days of
notification of the hearing date, reasoning that the rule was not a ''procedural roadblock" when good
cause could be shown for the delay. Id. at 742.
265. Id. at 748 (Berdon, 1., dissenting).
266. Tillman v. Comm'r of CoIT., 738 A.2d 208, 213 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
267. See ALAN D. HORNSTEIN, APPELLATE ADVOCACY IN ANUTSHELL § 3-3 (1998); JONATHAN
M. PuRVER& LAWRENCE E. TAYLOR, HANDLINO CRIMINAL APPEALS §§ 35-42 (1980).
268. See Tillman, 600 A.2d at 742-43 ("The defendant bears the burden of making an adequate
record to support a challenge to a jury array."); id. at 748 ("The defendant made no attempt to lay a
proper foundation for the admission of the notes, even after the trial court pointed out this
requirement. ").
269. State v. Golding, 567 A.2d 823, 827 (Conn. 1989).
270. See Wesley W. Horton & Kenneth J. Bartschi, 2007 Connecticut Appellate Review, 82
CONN. B.J. 29 (2008) ("Preservation of issues is a persistent problem in criminal matters.").
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"articulation" from trial courts regarding the bases of their rulings.271
The reasons for requiring litigants to preserve claims and to create
adequate records are routinely recounted in appellate opinions-to
provide the fullest exposition of the issues to appellate courts; to avoid
"ambushing" trial courts and litigants.272 Such rules promote finality.273
Docket management concerns also playa role. Appeals courts are able
to dispose of many cases on these grounds, particularly cases that they
believe (based on their impressions) do not present any interesting or
274
important legal or factual issues.
Certainly, some may argue that strict preservation rules create an
incentive for counsel to zealously litigate issues at trial, or face the
prospect that they will be deemed waived. In other words, the argument
275
goes, loose preservation requirements might encourage sandbagging.
However,

as

others-perhaps most notably Justice

Brennan-have

argued, an attorney's failure to raise a claim may reflect mere negligence
or error as much as canny strategy. 276
In cases like Mr. Tillman's, in which an issue was brought to the trial
court's attention, a refusal to resolve a claim conclusively based on a
lawyer's failure to create an adequate record really only acts as tacit
acceptance of lawyering lapses. The incentives that are created are not

271. See Wesley W. Horton & Kenneth J. Bartschi, 2003 Connecticut Appellate Review, 77
CONN. BJ. 47, 51 (2003) (writing that authors had previously "complained about the Appellate Court's
tendency to duck issues by blaming appellants for not filing what we thought were unnecessary motions
for articulation," but noting that the Connecticut Supreme Court had reversed the Appellate Court for
one such decision that year).
272. As the Connecticut courts often explain: "These [preservation] requirements are not simply
formalities. They serve to alert the trial court to potential error while there is still time for the court to
act. ... Assigning error to a court's evidentiary rulings on the basis of objections never raised at trial
unfairly subjects the court and the opposing party to trial by ambush." State v. Calabrese, 902 A.2d
1044,1054 n.18 (Conn. 2006) (quoting State v. Cabral, 881 A.2d 247, 257, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1048
(2005» (internal quotation marks omitted).
273. John H. Blume & Christopher Seeds, Reliability Matters: Reassociating Bagley Materiality,
Strickland Prejudice, and Cumulative Harmless Error, 95 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1153, 1188-89
(2005) (in discussing preservation and procedural default rules, noting that "the fact that an error
impacting reliability wasn't raised on direct appeal or state collateral appeal does not dissolve its
reliability-impacting character: although interests in finality weigh against its tardy adjudication, its realworld impact on the reliability of the verdict remains").
274. Wesley W. Horton & Kenneth 1. Bartschi, 2001 Connecticut Appellate Review, 75 CONN.
BJ. 261, 283-85 (2001) (arguing that Connecticut Appellate Court was using motion for articulation as
a tool for dealing with high case load).
275. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,89 (1977) (warning in the habeas context that failure to
adopt a procedural default rule in the habeas corpus context "may encourage 'sandbagging' on the part
of defense lawyers, who may take their chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial court with the
intent to raise their constitutional claims in a federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay
off").

276. /d. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the ordinary procedural default is born of the
inadvertence, negligence, inexperience, or incompetence of trial counsel").
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for lawyers, but for trial courts-reassuring them that they need not
investigate further. To borrow Professor Nesson's lexicon, disposing of
cases in this manner provides "authoritative resolution," without
"ascertainment of the truth. ,,277
As argued in Justice Berdon's dissent, Mr. Tillman's case provides a
reason to back away from over-reliance on rules that penalize defendants
for lawyers' imperfect litigation. Justice Berdon argued that the nature
of the claims in Mr. Tillman's case-claimed systematic exclusion of
minorities from the jury pool-called into question the integrity of the
system. 278 Allegations of racial bias in the selection of jury venires were
made in numerous cases in Connecticut around the time of Mr.
Tillman's case, suggesting that this was not an isolated incident. 279
Cases like Mr. Tillman's may provide a reason to strike a different
balance between finality and searching oversight. 28o
Justice Berdon would have granted Mr. Tillman a new tria1. 281 In this
situation, in which Mr. Tillman turned out to be factually innocent, a
new trial would at least have afforded him another chance to test the
State's evidence. Of course, new trials entail significant expenditure of
resources,282 and so adopting rules that afford them more frequently
could be costly. Another solution might address some of the same
systemic problems without the all-or-nothing effects of choosing
between affirmance or a new trial-use of a remand for more detailed
fact-finding on issues that appear potentially meritorious, or troubling,
277. Nesson, supra note 253, at 1194--95.
278. State v. Tillman, 600 A.2d 738, 752 (Conn. 1991) (Berdon, J., dissenting).
279. See. e.g., State v. Ellis, 621 A.2d 250, 252 (Conn. 1993) (defendant claimed that black
venirepersons were directed away from his trial to the Daniel Webb trial "to boost minority
representation on the jury panels in the Webb case"); State v. Henderson, 706 A.2d 480, 482-83 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1998) (at a pretrial hearing in 1995, the jury administrator for the state and the jury clerk that
testified in Mr. Tillman's case testified that the State kept no records of the racial demographics of the
jurors called for service). Indeed, in April, 1991, five months before the decision in Mr. Tillman's case,
and shortly after Mr. Tillman's case was argued, the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the
consolidated appeal of thirty-one habeas petitioners challenging their convictions based on the use of a
"town quota" system for selecting jury venires that had remained in effect until 1982, creating
disproportionately white juries. Habeas relief was denied the petitioners in Johnson based on
"procedural default"-another technical doctrine used to dispense with claims. Johnson v. Comm'r of
Corr., 589 A.2d 1214 (Conn. 1991). In the context of a federal habeas, the Second Circuit had held
Connecticut's "town quota" system to violate federal equal protection guarantees. Alston v. Manson,
791 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1986). The Connecticut Supreme Court previously had rejected this claim on
direct appeal in the same case. See State v. Haskins, 450 A.2d 828 (Conn. 1982).
280. In 1996, the Connecticut General Assembly passed a statute requiring collection of
information regarding the racial identity of those called for jury service. CONN. GEN STAT. § 51-232 (c)
(2008).
281. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 748 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
282. Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human. but Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be
Tolerated, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1167, 1169 (1995).
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but about which the lawyer has failed to create an adequate record. 283
It is possible that not even a remand for detailed fact-finding about the
practices of the Hartford Superior Court jury clerk would have resulted
in a new trial for Mr. Tillman; it is also possible that he would have been
convicted on retrial based on a certain but mistaken eyewitness (as was
the case with DNA exoneree Ronald Cotton).284 However, as Justice
Berdon suggested,285 reversing the conviction would have demonstrated
the court's concern about evidence of racial discrimination in the
Connecticut criminal justice system. It would have signaled to lower
courts and to lawyers and court personnel that Connecticut's judicial
leadership took very seriously allegations of racial bias in jury selection.
Over time, ordering hearings to investigate potential exclusion of
minorities from jury selection might have resulted in a more racially
representative jury pool, lessening the potential for the types of
cumulative unconscious bias mistakes. Finally, a reversal or remand
would have avoided the dissonance of a published opinion declining to
examine claimed racial discrimination, in the case of an AfricanAmerican man proven to have been falsely accused of the sexual assault
of a white woman. Thus, in Professor Nesson's terms, more rigorous
review of this issue might have enhanced both perception of
"authoritative resolution" and "determin[ation] of the truth.,,286
B. "But It Didn't Matter Anyway": Harm and Prejudice-Type Analyses

The factual error that contributed most significantly to Mr. Tillman's
wrongful conviction was a mistaken eyewitness identification. While
Mr. Tillman did not challenge the eyewitness identification procedure
itself on appeal, he did challenge the adequacy of the instruction on
factors that the jury could consider in evaluating the victim's
opportunity to observe. 287
The Connecticut Supreme Court said that the trial court could have
given the requested instruction, but that the instruction that it gave was
adequate. 288 It then went on to apply a standard that is employed in jury
instruction issues: whether "the defendant could establish that it was
283. Connecticut'S current Rules of Appellate Procedure appear to allow for such a mechanism.
CONN. PRAC. BOOK § 60-2 (2007) (an appellate court "may, on its own motion or upon motion of any
party ... remand any pending matter to the trial court for the resolution of factual issues where
necessary").
284. Thompson, supra note 215.
285. 600 A.2d at 751 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
286. Nesson, supra note 253, at 1194.
287. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 744-45.
288. [d. at 745.
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reasonably probable that the jury was misled.,,289 The court summarized
the victim's subjective assessment of her opportunity to view her
assailant, as well as her subjective statement of certainty and concluded
that, "[g]iven this positive identification testimony, and the instruction
that was given, we conclude that it is not reasonably probable that the
jury was misled by the court's refusal to charge in the specific language
that the defendant had requested. ,,290
Although not formally a harmful error analysis, the standard applied
to the jury instruction claim shares much in common with harm analysis.
In making this assertion, I am not relying on formal doctrines and
categories of harm analysis,291 but rather on a functional analysis-not
how the court describes what it is doing, but how its reasoning actually
operates. At base, the Connecticut Supreme Court's analysis of the
eyewitness identification instruction issue rested on a judgment about
whether the error, if one existed, mattered. And the way that the court
conducted that analysis rested fundamentally on a judgment about the
ultimate issue in the case: whether the victim was "positive" in her
identification, and, thus, whether Mr. Tillman was guilty.292
The danger of harm and prejudice type analyses is that their
application rests, all too often, on the appellate court's instinct about the
defendant's guilt or innocence, which in tum can be shaped by
psychological and institutional influences. For this reason, among
others, harmless error doctrine has been criticized. 293 Writing about
harm analysis and wrongful convictions, for example, Professor Garrett
warns that harm-type analyses often excuse violations of defendants'
rights "based on a discretionary, flexible, and broad examination of all
of the evidence before the jury, taking account of any general perception
of the guilt of the defendant.,,294 He argues that appeals court judges
289. Id. (citing State v. Shiflett, 508 A.2d 748, 766 (Conn. 1986)).
290. Id.
291. In his article, Judge Edwards outlines the history of hann analysis, describing the evolution
of various hann standards, including the hann standard for evidentiary trial errors, Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), and the more rigorous hann standard for constitutional violations,
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See Edwards, supra note 282, at 1173-83.
292. Professor Garrett has pointed out that the Manson reliability factors applied to due process
challenges to eyewitness identification procedures (similar to the factors considered by the court in Mr.
Tillman's jury instruction claim) also function as a kind ofhannless error test. Garrett, Harmless Error,
supra note 49, at 83.
293. Garrett, Harmless Error, supra note 49, at 61; Edwards, supra note 282, at 1171 (drawing
distinction between "guilt-based" and "effect-on-the-verdict" hann analysis). See also Blume & Seeds,
supra note 273 (arguing for a cumulative approach to various types ofhann and prejudice analysis under
Brady and Strickland, to promote the reliability of verdicts); Kamin, supra note 258, at 71 (noting that
hannless error "doctrine's malleability makes it an ideal instrument for the den[ialJ of relief to a wide
group oflitigants"); Otero, supra note 59.
294. Garrett, Harmless Error, supra note 49, at 61. By contrast, a Note recently has argued that
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should be loath to label error as "harmless" when a case bears "the
indicia of wrongful convictions,,295 or involves a claimed violation
linked to wrongful convictions. 296
Judge Harry Edwards has criticized harm analysis that takes a "guiltbased" approach rather than an "effect-on-the-verdict" approach.297 "The
problem with harmless error arises when we as appellate judges conflate
the harmlessness inquiry with our own assessment of a defendant's
guilt," he writes. 298 Relying on a seminal book by Judge Roger
Traynor,299 Judge Edwards argues that the "role of an appellate judge
should be limited to a determination of whether the error influenced the
jury .... ,,300 Judge Edwards acknowledged that, "[i]t is often a very
hard assignment to distinguish between the effect of an error on the
verdict and the effect of an error on one's intuition about factual
guilt.,,301 He particularly warned about the dangers of "guilt-based"
harm analysis that is based on eyewitness identification testimony.302
Professor Garrett argues that harm-type analysis is used not only in
formal harmless error review, but also in a number of standards applied
by appellate courts. He notes a number of doctrines that employ what he
(and others) describe as a "guilt-based approach," which operate as a
"second set" or "additional layer" of harmless error rules?03 As
examples, Professor Garrett points to ineffective assistance of counsel
and due process challenges to suggestive eyewitness identifications. 304
The Connecticut standard for evaluating instructional error applied in
Mr. Tillman's case operated functionally like a "guilt-based" harm
analysis. 305 It assessed the effects of any possible instructional error
against the quality of the victim's identification (which was the
foundation of the prosecution's case).306 Although framed as a
automatic reversal of structural error actually contributes to the narrowing of rights, arguing that courts
will restrict the right rather than reverse the conviction. Steven M. Shepard, Note, The Case Against
Automatic Reversal ofStructural Errors, 117 YALE LJ. 1180, 1186-90 (2008).
295. Garrett, Harmless Error, supra note 49, at 113.
296. Id. at 41.
297. Edwards, supra note 282, at 1171.
298. Id. at 1170.
299. ROGERJ. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 18-24(1970).
300. Edwards, supra note 282, at 1171.
301. Id. at 1205 (emphasis omitted).
302. Id. at 1169.
303. Garrett, Harmless Error, supra note 49, at 62.
304. Id. at 62 & n.134.
305. See id. at 58-59; Edwards, supra note 282, at 1187 (noting "the tendency of judges to apply
the [harmless error1 doctrine by assessing whether the evidence adduced at trial, or the untainted
evidence in the case of an evidentiary error, appears sufficient to support a guilty verdict").
306. State v. Tillman, 600 A.2d 738, 745 (Conn. 1991).

2009]

MR. TILLMAN'S CASE

1545

determination of whether it was "reasonably probable that the jury was
misled," the court's analysis hinged on the eyewitness's "positive
identification testimony. ,,307
Of course, it is possible that either a "guilt-based" or an "effect-onthe-verdict" analysis would have produced affirmance in Mr. Tillman's
appeal, given the nature of the instructional error. What is particularly
important to focus on here is that the court's focus on the certainty of the
witness's identification was problematic. Unbeknownst to the court at
the time of its 1991 opinion, its harm-type analysis was based on
subjective indicators that social science has subsequently debunked. 308
Professor Oldfather has argued that, if an appellate court is educated
about recent psychological research on eyewitness identification, its
evaluation of this evidence actually might be better than a jury's
assessment. 309 In this case, however, the court relied (as did the jury) on
the victim's "positive identification,,,310 which proved flawed.

C. "The Lawyer Wasn't That Bad and It Didn't Matter": Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
The Appellate Court opinion in Mr. Tillman's habeas appeal
illustrates another variety of the "second layer of harmless error rules"
described by Professor Garrett-the standard for judging ineffective
assistance of counsel. 311 Mr. Tillman had alleged ineffective assistance
of trial counsel for failing to make an adequate record regarding his jury
selection claims, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for
failing to argue that the trial court should have sua sponte ordered an
evidentiary hearing regarding the claim.312 The Appellate Court rejected
these claims, accepting the trial attorney's "investigation" of and
rejection of the jury selection claim; reasoning that the outcome of the
trial would not have been different; and deferring to appellate counsel's
decision not to raise the claim. 313

307. /d.
308. See supra

notes 180--84 and accompanying text. See also Garrett, Harmless Error, supra
note 49, at 80--87.
309. Oldfather, supra note 250, at 462 ("There is, in short, a good deal of judicial experience with
[eyewitness identification]. Jurors, even though instructed on the evaluation of eyewitness testimony,
lack the broader suspicion of this evidence necessary to engage in a consistent or sophisticated
evaluation of it.").
310. Tillman, 600 A.2d at 745. The court's analysis of this issue did not weigh or even mention
Mr. Tillman's denial, or his alibi witness.
311. Garrett, Harmless Error, supra note 49, at 62.
312. Tillman v. Comm'r ofCorr., 738 A.2d 208, 211-14 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
313. Id. at 212-14.
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creates what Professor Garrett has described as

"camouflaged harmless error doctrine" which he says "creates a

higher, often prohibitively difficult, outcome-determinative standard.,,314
The prejudice prong of

Strickland,

in particular, has been criticized by

commentators as essentially undermining the constitutional guarantee of
the right to effective counsel. 315 Commentators have noted that even
lawyering that fails to meet minimum Erofessional standards has been
excused because oflack of "prejudice.,,3 6

years-Williams v. Taylor,317 Wiggins v.
Rompilla v. Bearcf19-the United States Supreme Court

In a series of cases in recent

Smith,318

and

has signaled a need for more rigorous review of claimed ineffective
assistance of counsel in investigation of death penalty cases?20 Some
commentators have described this shift as a direct reaction to the DNA
exonerations.32! The

Williams- Wiggins-Rompilla

trilogy illustrates the

type of standard-setting that can reverse the slump of "second layer of
harmless error rules,,,322 and make Sixth Amendment analysis more
meaningful.

314. Garrett, Harmless Error, supra note 49, at 62.
315. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel/or the Poor: The Death Sentence Not/or the Worst Crime
but/or the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J.l835, 1862 (1994) ("Together, the lax standard of Strickland
and the strict procedural default doctrines reward the provision of deficient representation."); Brown,
supra note 27, at 1603 ("The court is rigorous about protecting the formal right to counsel but barely
regulates the quality of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, in which the Court defined the standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel, broadly protects defense lawyer discretion and gives wide leeway for
poor but routine lawyering judgments .... ") (internal footnotes omitted). The Connecticut Supreme
Court recently has adopted a new standard for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, making clear that habeas petitioners must only demonstrate a reasonable probability that the
result of their direct appeal would have beeo different, not that the outcome of their trial would have
been different-thus ensuring that they receive the benefit of the more favorable harm standard for
reviewing claimed constitutional error on direct appeal. However, in Small, the Court also concluded
that the petitioner in that case had failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have
prevailed on appeal, illustrating that the standard is still rigorous. Small v. Comm'r of Corr., 946 A.2d
1203 (Conn. 2008).
316. Bright, supra note 315, at 1857-62; Griffin, supra note 252, at 1274 ("The Strickland
standard has not been effective in eliminating the effects of even the most egregious defense lawyering
conduct.").
317. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
318. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
319. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
320. See Elizabeth Gale & Tyler Green, Wiggins v. Smith: The Ineffective Assistance 0/ Counsel
Standard Applied Twenty Years After Strickland, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 755, 760 (2004); Robert R.
Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and the Test for Ineffective
Assistance o/Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 77,85-98 (2007).
321. See Adele Bernhard, Exonerations Change Judicial Views on Ineffective Assistance 0/
Counsel, 18 CRIM. JUST. 37 (2003).
322. See Garrett, Harmless Error, supra note 49, at 62.
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In Mr. Tillman's case, however, the Connecticut habeas court and the
Appellate Court both deferred to counsel's decision to cut short
investigation.323 The investigation accepted by the Appellate Court was
a conversation with the jury clerk and the observation that there were
African-American jurors sitting in the murder trial next door. 324 This is
not an especially high hurdle for the Sixth Amendment standard,
particularly in a case in which the claim was rejected on direct appeal
for failure to request an evidentiary hearing or produce sufficient
evidence.
Why do state appellate courts employ harm and prejudice doctrines
that undercut procedural rights, or impose technical preservation
requirements that allow potentially meritorious claims to evade review?
In part, courts act in recognition of their limited institutional capacities
and out of respect for other players in the local criminal justice system.
They may want to avoid the expenditure of resources involved in a
second trial for someone whom they believe to be guilty of a heinous
crime.325 They may see real value in ensuring finality.326 Courts use
these doctrines as tools for caseload management, and for issue
avoidance. 327 State supreme courts also may not want to be perceived as

323. Tillman v. Comm'r ofCorr., 738 A.2d 208, 212-13 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
324. The entire analysis consisted of six sentences:
[The trial attorney] investigated the jury selection system by questioning [the jury clerk].
According to him, she described the method through which potential jurors could be
excused, but she offered nothing except her opinion of the disproportionate impact on
minorities to suggest that there was any sort of exclusion of black jurors. At the habeas
hearing, he testified that he also had learned "that there was a murder trial going on next
door, which did have-it appeared to be a substantial number of black jury panel
members-panel members, who would have come from the same array as we drew from.
So, again, [he] did not find any evidence of any systematic exclusion [or] any funneling
away from our panels to benefit or ... to influence other panels." [The trial attorney]
investigated, considered the issue and ultimately decided not to pursue it. We cannot
conclude that this conduct fell below the sixth amendment standard.
!d. (alterations in original and added).
325. Edwards, supra note 282, at 1169 ("If the conviction is reversed, the government and the trial
court will be forced to undergo the time and expense of retrying a case in which there appears to be little
doubt of the defendant's guilt.").
326. Johnson v. Comm'r ofCorr., 589 A.2d 1214, 1221 (Conn. 1991) (In explaining its adoption
of the rigorous federal procedural default standard in state habeas proceedings, the same year as Mr.
Tillman's trial, the Connecticut Supreme Court said, "[w]e are persuaded that habeas review of
constitutional claims never raised in the trial court, in violation of our rules of practice, would thrust too
great a burden on our criminal justice system.").
327. Horton & Bartschi, supra note 274. See also William M. Landes & Richard A Posner,
Harmless Error, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 161,181 (2001) (developing an economic model of the harmless
error rule and observing that appellate judges may employ harmless error analysis because it "reduces
the number of appeals by reducing the number of retrials ... [and] may well also reduce the average
cost of an appeal by enabling the court to 'duck' difficult issues").

1548

UNIVERSITYOFCINCINNATILAWREVIEW

[Vol. 77

"activist" or as ruling by judicial fiat. 328 Without minimizing these
concerns, I argue that cases like Mr. Tillman's provide an occasion to
reassess courts' reliance on doctrines that avoid merits review or excuse
error. By deciding what claims they will review and which errors they
will countenance, state appeals courts signal to criminal justice actors
where resources and attention should be focused. Mr. Tillman's
exoneration is a moment to acknowledge this signaling role, and to
consider whether the court's emphasis should be different.
IV. THE ROLE OF ApPELLATE COURTS
One story that can be told about Mr. Tillman's case is that appellate
courts are simply not well-situated to guard against miscarriages of
justice. They make legal rulings based on a record; they do not know
facts outside the record; and they rely largely on the functioning of the
adversary process in the lower courts to flesh out possible factual errors.
According to this narrative, if the jurors were convinced by a certain but
mistaken eyewitness, there is little that reviewing courts can do to avert
tragedy. In short, it is simply a harsh reality that in some cases there is
factual error, but no legal error. 329
The lessons of Mr. Tillman's case, however, are not just about
whether a specific error in his case could have been identified. And the
question that I pose is not "which part of the system is most in need of
reform-trial or appeals?" It is beyond dispute that the DNA
exonerations have demonstrated a need for reform in the trial and
investigative processes. Nonetheless, there are also important lessons for
appeals courts, and more muscular appellate review might have an effect
on a criminal justice system over the long-term.
Appellate courts are not simply left holding the bag after other players
have botched investigations, prosecutions, trials, and appeals. They are
also leaders in local criminal justice systems; they are institutions that
set a tone and that can, through their formulation and application of
standards, and through their attention alone, create certain incentives.
At the risk of characterizing a contested proposition in a conc1usory
manner, I submit that, in certain ways, appellate and postconviction
decrees drive a system. To be sure, commentators question whether
constitutional criminal procedure rules announced by courts make much

328. See The Honorable Lynn Adelman & Shelley Fite, Exercising Judicial Power: A Response to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's Critics, 91 MARQ. L. REv. 425, 426 (2007) (describing criticism of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court as "activist").
329. Thanks to Professors Everett, Garrett, and Lasch for focusing my attention on this issue.

2009]

MR. TILLMAN'S CASE

1549

difference. 33o The academic literature is full of articles about whether
Miranda/ 31 Brady,332 and Manson,333 to name a few, have changed the
behavior of police and prosecutors. 334 Scholars also have questioned
whether certain constitutional rights regularly litigated on appeal (e.g.,
confrontation rights) actually affect the accuracy of judgments. 335 In
addition, it can be difficult to parse whether criminal procedure rules
produce less-than-expected impact because such rules are ineffectual
agents of change, or simply because they are not enforced rigorously?36
If one accepts, however, that at least certain procedural rights enhance
fundamental fairness and have some effect on overall accuracy, then
under-enforcement of these rights over the long term can produce holes
in the "safety net.,,337 This may be particularly true for rights designed to
guard against racial discrimination if, as the growing literature on
wrongful convictions suggests, the potential for error is heightened by
the cumulative effects of bias at each stage of the proceedings. 338
Some of the issues in Mr. Tillman's case-treatment of the
eyewitness identification and racial composition of the jury-are linked
(whether directly or indirectly) to the causes of wrongful convictions.
And Mr. Tillman's case contains some factors that commonly are found
in wrongful convictions (e.g., cross-racial identification). The question
remains whether the legal claims presented--demands for a different
jury instruction or an evidentiary hearing about jury selection
processes-would have averted Mr. Tillman's wrongful conviction,
even with the most searching appellate review imaginable. Viewed in
330. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, I 07 YALE LJ. I, 52 (\997) ("[T]he law of criminal procedure is part of a larger system in which

a variety of actors have a great deal of freedom of movement. Those actors respond to the law; they also
respond to other forces outside the law, to crime rates and case loads and funding levels. The combined
effect of these forces is complicated.").
331. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REv. 1519 (2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1095620.
332. See Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REv. 685 (2006).
333. See Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237 (2006).
334. These three standards are rules that are supposed to affect reliability of confessions, of
identifications, and of adjudication. There is even more scholarly debate about whether rules designed to
deter police misconduct, like the exclusionary rule, actually accomplish their purpose or are worth the
costs. See Stuntz, supra note 330, at 3. Compare William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the
Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'y 443 (1997), with Akhil Reed Amar, Against Exclusion
(Except to Protect Truth or Prevent Privacy Violations), 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'y 457 (1997).
335. Brown, Decline of Defense Counsel, supra note 27, at 1606 (arguing that some constitutional
criminal procedural rules are "fairly weak guardians of accuracy" because they "apply only at trial and
thus only to a small number of cases").
336. See Gershman supra note 332, at 708-15 (explaining how Brady was eroded by later
precedents).
337. Otero, supra note 59, at 119 (arguing that harmless error analysis erodes the "safety net").
338. Taslitz. supra note 220, at 133.
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isolation, a different decision on these issues may not have changed the
verdict.
However, the opinions announced in these cases cannot be viewed in
isolation. If courts look with particular rigor at cases that "bear the
indicia" of wrongful convictions,339 then wrongful convictions may be
averted. 340 If jurors are educated about the problems of eyewitness
identification; if prosecutors and trial judges are warned to pay attention
to jury selection techniques with potential racial bias, then some of the
problems that have produced wrongful convictions may be addressed
over time, and the potential for mistakes is lessened.
At the state habeas level, the decision of the Appellate Court is in one
sense even more closely linked to the systemic causes of wrongful
conviction, because it relates to defense investigation. As the United
States Supreme Court recently has reaffirmed in Williams- WigginsRompilla, investigation is critical to reliable and fair results. 341
Commentators studying wrongful convictions have called for improved
investigation and more merits litigation. 342 Yet in Tillman the Appellate
Court largely deferred to trial counsel's decision to short-circuit
investigation of racial bias in jury selection. 343 Deference is even more
routinely accorded decisions to cut-short "street" investigation of
crimes. 344
Appellate decisions affect the focus of actors in the criminal justice
system, and influence the allocation of resources, albeit imperfectly.345 If
the Connecticut Supreme Court interprets a Connecticut statute to
provide appointed counsel in various postconviction proceedings, those
proceedings will be litigated more vigorously.346 If Connecticut courts
grant new trials when counsel fails to present evidence of a plausible
defense, trial attorneys will consider defense evidence more carefully

339. Garrett, Harmless Error, supra note 49, at 113.
340. I thank Professor Timothy Everett in particular for his thoughts about why State v. Tillman is
not, as he puts it, a"failure ofleadership" case.
341. See supra notes 317-19.
342. Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 22, at 123-27; Stuntz, supra note 330, at 70-74.
343. Tillman v. Comrn'r ofCorr., 738 A.2d 208, 212-13 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
344. Brown, supra note 27, at 1603 ("Lax investigation rarely fails the Strickland standard even
though it can change case outcomes.").
345. Connecticut courts have demonstrated on nwnerous occasions that they are sensitive to this
responsibility. See supra notes 64-65. See also NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM. OF THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009), available at http://tcpjusticedenied.org/ (describing
inadequate resources available for indigent defenses) [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED].
346. See State v. Casiano, 922 A.2d 1065 (Conn. 2007); Gipson v. Comrn'r of Corr., 778 A.2d
121 (Conn. 2001).
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and investigate more thoroughly.347 Similarly, if appellate courts defer to
any offered explanation for counsel's ostensibly strategic decisions, and
if they excuse lawyering lapses for lack of "prejudice," ineffective
assistance of counsel doctrine will be less of a check. 348 On the other
hand, if they follow the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court in WilliamsWiggins-Rompilla, and conduct a more searching inquiry, ineffective
assistance of counsel doctrine will help to police the system.
Even more significant, a statement from the highest appellate court in
a criminal justice system disseminates a normative message. 349 Gideon
v. Wainwright did not solve the indigent defense problem in the nation
(far from it),350 but it did raise expectations, and make a start. This is
what we refer to as the "promise" or "dream" of Gideon. 351 After all,
most of us would prefer to have the unrealized dream of Gideon than a
message from the U.S. Supreme Court that it is indifferent to the
provision of counsel. The normative message opens the door to further
litigation, and it provides leverage for seeking additional resources from
the legislature. It also sets a tone for actors in the criminal justice
system, and influences the culture of the courthouses in which
prosecutors, defenders, and trial judges work.
Justice Berdon anticipated some of these points in his dissent in State
v. Tillman. At a time when the Connecticut media and public was
focused on high-profile cross-racial sexual assault cases, most notably
the arraignment of Daniel Webb, Justice Berdon saw value in
demonstrating sensitivity to allegations of racial bias. He was concerned
with the historical resonance of such cases, and with the legitimacy of
the system. His concern has proved prescient.

347. Bryant v. Comm'r ofCorr., 964 A.2d 1186 (Conn. 2009).
348. Bright, supra note 315, at 1858-66.
349. Edwards, supra note 282, at 1198-99 ("We send a message through our criminal justice
system each time we reverse or remand a conviction on the ground that the police or prosecutors have
violated a defendant's individual rights. Upon receiving such a message, the criminal justice process
corrects itself accordingly."). 1 focus on the potential for wrongful convictions because this article
examines Mr. Tillman's case, but as Professor Charles Ogletree has pointed out, there are other societal
values besides accuracy that are at stake in criminal appeals. Charles 1. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v.
Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152,
168--69 (1991).
350. Bright, supra note 315, at 1837 ("More than ... thirty years after Gideon, this task remains
uncompleted, the dream unrealized."); Stuntz, supra note 330, at 70 (arguing that because defense
investigation is "[i)nsufficient ... Gideon, while not trivial, means vastly less than it seems"). See also
STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, A.B.A. GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE:
AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.abanet.orglle
galservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf.
351. Bright, supra note 315, at 1836--37.
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CONCLUSION

In 2009, we are in no position to criticize the Tillman courts. We now
have the benefit of social science research, collective experience, and
hindsight that were not available to the courts that decided the Tillman
cases. However, we can learn some lessons from the Tillman decisions
now that we know the truth.
Appellate courts are removed from the trial process; they play a
limited role; and they often face significant case load pressures.
However, customary methods of coping with these realities can produce
dangers in appellate opinions. Disposing of cases too often based on
lawyering missteps or prejudice- or harm-type analyses can render
appellate opinions ineffective enforcers of important rights-both trial
rights and rights that affect investigative practices. It can signal to
lawyers and trial judges that some amount of slippage will be tolerated.
Appellate courts should push back on the institutional pressures that
burden them. Rather than using threshold issues as a means of docket
management, or undercutting procedural rights by relying on harm
analysis to avoid granting relief, courts should send a message that they
demand high quality work from other system actors, earlier in the
process. When courts order evidentiary hearings; grant discovery; or set
standards that require investigation or funding, they reinforce the rigor
of the criminal justice system and reduce the likelihood of wrongful
convictions.
Critics will surely counter that new hearings, remands, and retrials all
demand resources. Are these resources available, they will ask, and, if
so, wouldn't they be better spent at the front-end, investigating cases,
since so many of the errors present in the wrongful conviction cases
could have been discovered through better investigation?352 It is
certainly true that there are many needs in the criminal justice system.
However, the effects of rigorous appellate review extend beyond an
individual litigant's case, reverberating throughout a system, whenever a
lawyer reads a slip opinion or cites a precedent. As those who have
practiced in a local court system will understand, the work of state
appeals courts affects the norms of practice in the jurisdiction,
leveraging the resources expended in anyone reversal.
Averting wrongful convictions benefits others besides the innocent
accused. It ensures that the search for the real culprit continues, which
safeguards the public. And it protects the victim from having to relive a
352. See Brown, supra note 27, at 1644 (recommending refonns to improve factual investigation
"because we distrust adjudication's capacity to detect factual errors"). See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note
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terrible experience years later, when the case resurfaces. 353
Even if confronting difficult issues does not produce an immediate
effect on reliability in an individual case, it can enhance the legitimacy
of the system, as Justice Berdon argued in his dissent in Mr. Tillman's
case. 354 A court's efforts to address possible racial bias can buffer the
system from crisis when controversies that expose differing perceptions
arise,355 or, as in Mr. Tillman's case, when a grave mistake is uncovered.
State courts today operate largely without even the interstitial back-up
of federal habeas, possessing nearly ultimate responsibility for oversight
of their criminal justice systems. 356 For this reason, appellate decisions
must create incentives for the initial investigation and trial of criminal
cases to be meaningful and effective. This requires expenditure of
resources, but it is well worth the effort. We owe it to Mr. Tillman, and
to the others affected by wrongful convictions whose names we may
never know.

353. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 215. Rape victim Jennifer Thompson describes her retraumatization in realizing what her mistaken identification of exoneree Ronald Cotton had cost him. Id.
See THOMPSON-CANNINO ET AL., supra note 215.
354. State v. Tillman, 600 A.2d 738, 752 (Conn. 1991) (Berdon, 1., dissenting).

355. Cf Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffinan & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe: Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARv. L. REv. 837, 838 (2008)
(demonstrating that human beings tend to resolve disputed factual issues in ways that are protective of
their group identities, and arguing that courts should avoid "culturally partisan" forms of analysis that
fail to acknowledge competing perceptions).
356. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.

